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"JUST TAKE AWAY THEIR GUNS": THE
HIDDEN RACISM OF TERRY V. OHIO
Adina Schwartz*
I. Introduction
Noted social scientist James Q. Wilson recently argued that the
best way to deal with illegal gun-carrying in the United States is to
increase police use of stops and frisks, i.e. detaining individuals for-
cibly and patting down the outer surfaces of their clothing for
weapons.1 Wilson conceded that if his proposal were instituted,
"[i]nnocent people will be stopped. Young black and Hispanic
men will probably be stopped more often than older white Anglo
males or women of any race."2 These expected consequences,
however, did not give Wilson any pause. Instead of deploring the
expected racially disparate impact, analyzing its normative implica-
tions, or considering its causes or likely effects on race relations,
Wilson simply concluded that the use of stops and frisks must be
escalated "if we are serious about reducing drive-by shootings, fa-
tal gang wars and lethal quarrels in public places."3
Wilson's proposal is not merely an abstract possibility. During
the second half of 1992, prominent criminologist Lawrence Sher-
man collaborated with the Kansas City (Missouri) Police Depart-
ment in conducting the "Kansas City Gun Experiment."4 In a
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Law School, 1985; legal practice 1985-1993, including Associate Appellate Counsel,
Federal Defender Services Unit Appeals Bureau, New York City Legal Aid Society.
Versions of this paper were presented to the CUNY Law and Society Study Group,
March 1995; to the New York Group of the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs,
February 1995; at the 46th Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology,
November 1994; and at a conference on International Perspectives on Crime, Drugs
and Public Order at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, June 1994. I would like to
thank those present for their comments and James B. Jacobs for comments on an
early draft.
1. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar.
20, 1994, at 47 [hereinafter Just Take Away Their Guns]; James Q. Wilson, What to Do
about Crime, 98 COMMENTARY, Sept. 1994, at 25, 28 (Sept. 1994).
2. Just Take Away Their Guns, supra note 1, at 47.
3. Id.
4. For the fullest account of the Kansas City Gun Experiment, see LAWRENCE W.
SHERMAN, ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT (National Institute of Justice
Research in Brief, January 1995) [hereinafter KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT,
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target area with an almost entirely non-white population and a
homicide rate about 20 times higher than the national average, se-
lected officers were assigned to patrol exclusively for illegal guns,
using stops and frisks as a principal means for effecting gun
seizures. 5  Sherman and his colleagues recently published a
favorable evaluation of their own experiment, based on a compari-
son between the target area and a "control" area where police
practices remained unchanged during the experiment and where
the number of drive-by shootings in 1991 was almost the same as in
the target area.6 Sherman found that during the Kansas City Gun
Experiment, 65 percent more guns were seized in the target area
than in the preceding six months, gun crimes decreased by 49 per-
cent, drive-by shootings dropped from .7 to 1, and homicides were
significantly reduced.7 By contrast, drive-by shootings rose from
six to twelve and there were no significant changes in numbers of
homicides, guns seized or gun crimes between the same two time
periods in the control area.8 In favorably assessing the Kansas City
Gun Experiment, Sherman did not consider whether or to what
extent the value of the decrease in gun crime was offset by in-
creased police intrusions on the privacy of innocent people in gen-
eral, or innocent members of minority groups in particular. Thus,
Sherman reported that "[t]raffic stops were the most productive
method of finding guns, with an average of one gun found in every
28 traffic stops,"9 but he failed to consider the normative implica-
tions of this fact: for every gun seized during the Kansas City ex-
periment, at least twenty-seven stops intruded on the privacy of
credited to Sherman]. See also Lawrence W. Sherman, Remarks at the Session on
Getting Guns off the Streets: Urban Disarmament in Kansas City, 46th Annual Meet-
ing of the American Society of Criminology (November 11, 1994) [hereinafter Sher-
man Comments]; James W. Shaw, Detecting Guns through Trial and Error: Taking
Them Out of the Hands of Criminals and off the Street (November 11, 1994) (unpub-
lished manuscript presented at the Session on Getting Guns off the Streets: Urban
Disarmament in Kansas City, 46th Annual Meeting of the American Society of Crimi-
nology, on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) [hereinafter Detecting Guns];
J.W. Shaw, Community Policing Against Guns: Public Opinion of the Kansas City
Gun Experiment (1995) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Community Policing
Against Guns]; Fox Butterfield, A Way to Get the Gunmen: Get the Quns, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1994, at 22 [hereinafter A Way to Get the Gunmen]; Capital Approach to Gun
Crimes: D.C. May Be Next City to Try Stop-and-Search Tactics, LAW ENFORCEMENT
NEws, Feb. 14, 1995 at 1, col. 2.
5. KANSAS City GUN EXPERIMENT, supra note 4, at 1, 3-6.
6. Id. at 1-3.
7. Id. at 1-2, 6-7.
8. Id. at 1-2, 7..
9. Id. at 2, 6.
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innocent stoppees. These innocent stoppees were overwhelmingly
black.10
Sherman did caution that "[i]ntensified gun patrols . . .could
conceivably have negative effects on police-community relations
.... [and] could even provoke more crime by making youths sub-
jected to traffic stops more defiant of conventional society.""
10. Sherman's figures do not enable one to determine precisely how many people
were subject to traffic stops during the Kansas City Gun Experiment. Nor do the
figures enable one to determine how many of those stopped were found to be illegally
carrying guns or to be otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Sherman fails to indi-
cate how many people were in the stopped cars, how many guns were recovered from
each traffic stop that resulted in a gun recovery, and how many of the people stopped
were found to be engaged in illegal activity, other than gun carrying. In addition,
although Sherman repoi-s that "[n]ot all of the guns [seized] were carried illegally,"
his statement that "about one-fifth (14) of the total 76 guns seized in the target area
... were [legally carried but] confiscated by police for 'safekeeping' "leaves open the
possibility that during the experiment, additional numbers of legal guns were seized
but not confiscated. KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT, supra note 4, at 6. For a dis-
cussion of the importance of precise comparisons of the numbers of people whose
stops do and do not yield incriminating evidence, see infra Section V.
11. KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT, supra note 4, at 9 (footnote omit-
ted)(downplaying the importance of these and other cautions by concluding that "[a]ll
of these hazards are possible but unknown. The tradeoff is the well-known risk of gun
violence, which is extremely high in many inner cities and still rising."). Concern
about the impact of Kansas City-type gun experiments on police-community relations
is the avowed motivation for a separate manuscript, Community Policing Against
Guns, supra note 4, by James W. Shaw, one of Sherman's co-authors on KANSAS CITY
GUN EXPERIMENT. Shaw writes:
Regardless of the strategy's promise for reducing gun crime, it will have lim-
ited value if the price of success is community hostility towards the police.
Such hostility adversely affects police work in many respects, e.g., by making
citizens unwilling to assist the police or even report crimes to the police
when victimized, by making the police reluctant to act when they should or
by tending to [make police] over-react when they do act, by making police
work more dangerous, and by contributing to major riots and disturbances.
Thus one critically important question about the.., results [in reduction of
gun crime of the Kansas City experiment] is whether the method was accept-
able to the community.
Community Policing Against Guns, supra note 4, at 3 (citation omitted). See also id.
at 20 ("Citizens' perceptions of police patrols, proactive or otherwise, are likely to be
fairly subjective. Nonetheless, knowledge of their perceptions is important for deter-
mining the acceptability of police strategies and tactics.").
Notwithstanding this avowed motivation, Shaw's manuscript provides scant infor-
mation about the effects of the Kansas City Experiment on attitudes towards the po-
lice. First, the basis for Shaw's favorable assessment of the effects of the Kansas City
Experiment is a survey in which residents of the Kansas City target and control areas
were asked how they felt about their neighborhoods and their safety before and after
the Gun Experiment. However, the survey did not include any questions about resi-
dents' feelings towards the police. Id. at 22-29. See also KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERI-
MENT, supra note 4, at 2, 8 (describing the survey). Moreover, as Shaw himself
recognizes, his survey of community residents' feelings is totally uninformative in re-
gard to "what the arrestees and people who were stopped thought of the method [of
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These cautions avoid the issue, however, of whether the value of
Kansas City-type gun experiments might be offset by resulting in-
vasions of individual privacy or racial injustices, even in the ab-
sence of community opposition or defiance. An unvoiced
assumption in Sherman's favorable evaluation is that even where,
as in Kansas City, the people stopped and frisked during gun ex-
periments are overwhelmingly black, an evaluation of such experi-
ments does not depend on the causes of the racial disparity.
Although he called for some further research, 2 Sherman did not
call for an inquiry into the extent to which racial disparity in the
incidence of stops and frisks was likely to result from police racial
bias or greater black criminality and correlated police expertise in
apprehending those most likely to be involved in crime.13
Many police departments are expected to emulate Sherman's
Kansas City Gun Experiment.14 Sherman has already directed an
enhanced use of stops and frisks that the Kansas City Experiment employed]." Id. at
29. In an attempt to minimize the significance of this gap in his data, Shaw notes that
"no one filed a complaint against the police or filed a lawsuit" as a result of the Kan-
sas City Experiment. Id. This absence of legal action on the part of those arrested or
stopped is compatible, however, with both resentment of police and cynicism or de-
spair about the possibility of obtaining legal redress. In other words, Shaw fails to
rule out the possibility, noted by Sherman, that Kansas City-type experiments "could
even provoke more crime by making youths subjected to traffic stops more defiant of
conventional society." Id. at 9.
12. Id.
13. In a separate manuscript, Sherman's collaborator, James W. Shaw, argues that
concern with the racial impact of police efforts to drive guns off the street is obviated
by the fact that blacks are disproportionately victimized by violent crime. According
to Shaw:
A note of concern... is that the impact of such a [police] focus [on firearms]
may not be shared equally by all in the society. However, it is clear that
violent crime is also not shared equally by all in society, but is concentrated
among the poor, the young, and racial minorities. The unfortunate reality
then is that anything less than a focus on guns and violent crime by the po-
lice may itself be unequal treatment of those same populations, the poor, the
young, and racial minorities.
Detecting Guns, supra note 4, at 2 (citations omitted).
This assumes away a problem that, in accord with many other social scientists, Sher-
man himself recognized as recently as 1992. Namely, instead of using the powers
granted to them by proactive gun patrol programs to target those most likely to be
involved in crime, police may instead target blacks for intrusion because of racial
animus and/or an unjustified assumption that all blacks are dangerous. See infra notes
204-211, 222-223 and accompanying text. If, however, police thus use their discretion
under proactive programs to express racial bias, Shaw cannot assume, without argu-
ment, that these programs serve to protect blacks from violent crime.
14. Lawrence W. Sherman, In Remembrance: James Wilford Shaw, Criminologist,
20 THE CRIMINOLOGIST 23 (Sept./Oct. 1995) ("A conservative estimate is that over
100 other police agencies adopted a similar program [to the Kansas City Gun Experi-
ment]"); Cf Gerry Lanosga & Kathleen M. Johnston, Police Dispute Gun Data, INDI-
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experiment in Indianapolis from October 1994 to April 1995,15 and
the United States Attorney for the Washington D.C. has an-
nounced that Sherman will be advising an experiment in Washing-
ton D.C. as well. 16 Using the racially neutral criterion of amount of
gun crime per square mile, three Indianapolis areas-one with a
predominantly white population and two with predominantly black
populations-were targeted for escalated stops and frisks.17 As the
race of the people stopped in each area was expected largely to
mirror the race of the area's population,' 8 the selection of both
black and white target areas provided an opportunity for testing
two hypotheses: (i) independent of behavioral indications of crimi-
nality, the race of those driving through each area and thus avail-
able for stopping would affect officers' readiness to stop and/or
frisk, the types of circumstances that officers perceived as indicat-
ing a need to stop and/or frisk, and/or would impact on the relative
intrusiveness of the stops and frisks effected; 19 and (ii) independent
of behavioral indications of criminality, decisions to stop and/or
frisk and/or the relative intrusiveness of stops and frisks would be
affected by whether people driving through each area were racially
out of place (i.e., whether whites were in a predominantly black
target area or blacks were in the predominantly white target
ANAPOLIS NEWS, May 18, 1995, at A2 [hereinafter Police Dispute Gun Data];
Telephone Interview with Marie Simonetti Rosen, Publisher of Law Enforcement
News (Mar. 24, 1995).
15. See, e.g., Indy Gun-Interdiction Drive Proves an Inviting Target, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT NEWS, July 20, 1995 at 1; Looking for Experts, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May
26, 1995 at A10; Kathleen M. Johnston & Gerry Lanosga, Suggestions Arise from Gun
Dispute, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, May 19, 1995, at B1; Police Dispute Gun Data, supra
note 14; Real Gun Control, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 26, 1994; Capital Approach to
Gun Crimes: D.C. May Be Next City to Try Stop-and-Search Tactics, supra note 4, at 1;
A Way to Get the Gunmen, supra note 4.
16. Ruben Castena, One City's Attack on Handguns, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1995, at
B1.
17. See Real Gun Control, supra note 15; Cf. Police Dispute Gun Data, supra note
14, at A2 (experiment targeted three high crime areas).
18. Sherman Comments, supra note 4.
19. See infra notes 139, 145-46, 156, 186-188, 198-205, 213-214, 222 and accompa-
nying text for research, including earlier work by Sherman, arguing for this
hypothesis.
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area)., 0 Sherman did not collect the necessary data for testing
these hypotheses, however.2'
Wilson and Sherman have both explicitly recognized that the le-
gality of their proposals for escalated use of stops and frisks rests
on the relaxed standards that the United States Supreme Court es-
tablished in 1968 in Terry v. Ohio.22 This Article addresses an un-
noted kinship between Terry and. Wilson's and Sherman's
proposals. In his opinion for the Terry majority, Chief Justice Earl
Warren deplored the facts that police used stops and frisks as a
means of racial harassment and that this was a major cause of ex-
plosive tension between the police and minority communities.2 3
Nevertheless, the Terry majority held that these facts provided no
reason to establish strict standards for the exercise of the stop and
frisk power.24 This argument has received scant critical attention.25
20. Some courts have held that a stop may be justified by the fact that a person is
racially out of place. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 456 (6th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936 (1991); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (1975) ("That
a person is observed in a neighborhood not frequented by persons of his ethnic back-
ground is quite often a basis for an officer's initial suspicion. To attempt by judicial
fiat to say he may not do this ignores the practical aspects of law enforcement."). For
discussion and criticism of this line of cases and consideration of some courts' refusal
to allow stops to be justified by racial incongruity, see Developments in the Law-
Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1502, 1519 (1988)[hereinaf-
ter Developments in the Law]; Sherilynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a
Suspect, 93 YALE L. J. 214, 225-30, 240-41 (1983).
For works arguing that police in fact tend to be suspicious of people who are ra-
cially out of place, see, e.g., CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUES-
TION OF COLOR 138 (1993); Brief for N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Terry v. Ohio [hereinafter N.A.A.C.P. Brief], reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 66 (P.B. KURLAND & GERHARD CASPER, EDS.
1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS] at 577-78, 616, 620-21; KERNER COMMISSION,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 303 (1968)
[hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION REPORT]; David J. Smith, A Survey of Londoners,
in 1 POLICE AND PEOPLE IN LONDON 1, 113 (Police Studies Inst. No. 618, Nov. 1983).
21. Sherman Comments, supra note 4.
22. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Just Take Away Their Guns, supra note 1, at 47; What to Do
about Crime, supra note 1, at 28; KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT, supra note 4, at 5,
6. See also Detecting Guns, supra note 4, at 5; Butterfield, supra note 4 (commenting
on Sherman's gun experiments, Butterfield noted: "Phillip Heyman, a professor at
Harvard Law School and former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Adminis-
tration, said he believed the local police have more power than they realized to go
after illegal guns, authority that grows out of a 1968 United States Supreme Court
decision, Terry v. Ohio.").
23. 392 U.S. at 14, 14 n.11, 15, 17 n.14.
24. 392 U.S. at 14-15.
25. This argument is totally ignored in two of the most important law review arti-
cles on the racial basis of decisions to stop and arrest. See Developments in the Law,
supra note 20, at 1494-1520; Johnson, supra note 20. Similarly, only ignorance of this
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However, the assumption underlying the Terry holding-that facts
about racial impact are irrelevant to delineating the proper scope
of the stop and frisk power-provided the legal sanction for the
lack of concern with race that Wilson's and Sherman's current pro-
posals evince.26 Moreover, Terry contributed to the bedrock as-
sumption that this Article seeks to discredit: that lack of concern
with racial issues is simply part of realism about fighting crime.
This Article argues that in formulating standards for stops and
frisks, courts, police departments and other policy makers should
consider: (i) whether and to what extent blacks are more fre-
quently stopped and frisked than whites; (ii) whether and to what
extent this disparity reflects police racial bias; and (iii) the nature
and extent of the resulting negative effects.27
argument can explain Peller's contention that "from within the Court's mode of pres-
entation, the defendants in cases like Terry v. Ohio just 'happened to be black,' in
contrast to a race-conscious approach that would understand that the issue raised in
the stop-and-frisk context arose precisely because police were suspicious of blacks in
particular." Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending
the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TuL. L. REV. 2231, 2245 (1993). See also Dwight L.
Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Color-
less Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 2040 n.224 (1993) (re-
flecting ignorance of this argument, as discussed infra text accompanying note 117);
John M. Burkoff, Non-Investigatory Police Encounters, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
681, 704 (1978) (reflecting ignorance of this argument, as discussed infra note 131).
For mistaken interpretations and assessments of the validity of this argument, see
infra notes 131, 134, 180 and accompanying text.
26. As discussed infra notes 140-141, 222-223 and accompanying text, before con-
ducting his gun experiments, Sherman devoted substantial scholarly attention to as-
sessing the extent and causes of the racially disparate impact of proactive police
policies and police exercise of deadly force. It is therefore both ironic and unfortu-
nate that in conducting and evaluating the gun experiments, he left such concerns
behind.
For criticism and discussion of attempts by Sherman and his colleagues to dismiss
concerns about the racial impact of the Gun Experiments, see supra note 14 and infra
notes 224-225 and accompanying text.
27. Legal commentary in this area has been largely limited to the issue of the
extent to which courts do and should allow officers to use race to justify individual
decisions to stop, arrest, or otherwise detain citizens. See, e.g., Developments in the
Law, supra note 20, at 1494-1520 (1988); Johnson, supra note 20; Gregory Howard
Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual but Continual Ero-
sion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567, 576-77, 582-87 (1991). The concern here is
not with judicial scrutiny of the racial basis of individual decisions to detain, but
rather with whether facts about the racial impact of stops and frisks should be taken
into account in the formulation of general, racially neutral standards. While this Arti-
cle advocates taking account of racial impact in the formulation of racially neutral
standards for police action, some scholars have claimed that the proper response to
racial impact is legal standards that vary with the race of those subject to the police
action. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 25, at 2024-43, 2045-48, 2061-62; Tracey Macin,
Black and Blue Encounters, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 268-79 (1991). For further dis-
cussion, see also infra note 110.
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These issues are of practical import because no police depart-
ment or influential policy maker today is likely explicitly to direct
officers to target blacks for stops and frisks;28 however, Wilson and
Sherman have shown that some of this Nation's most important
policy makers are ready to institute racially neutral guidelines for
enhanced use of stops and frisks and to acknowledge that this will
intrude more on blacks than on whites.29 At the same time, these
policy makers are not prepared even to consider whether and to
what extent the expected racial disparity is likely to stem from po-
lice racial bias or good police work consisting of stopping and frisk-
ing those in fact most likely to be involved in crime. Though
Sherman does call for future inquiry into the possible negative con-
sequences of the racially disparate impact,3" Wilson is totally un-
concerned with such consequences. Under Terry, this lack of
concern with racial impact is legal. The question posed by this Ar-
ticle is whether the law's lack of concern is justifiable and, if it is,
whether police departments and policy makers should nonetheless
attend to racial impact. To answer this question, it is necessary to
examine critically the largely forgotten argument, in Terry, that
facts about racial impact have no bearing on the law's delimitation
of the racially neutral extent of the stop and frisk power.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the decision in
Terry and its impact on subsequent case law. It shows that by ex-
cepting stops and frisks from the Fourth Amendment's traditional
probable cause requirement, Terry created powerful tools for the
legal expansion of law enforcement powers. Part III discusses the
Terry opinion, focussing, in subparts B through D, on Terry's am-
bivalent position on race relations. Subparts B and D establish
that the empirical contention that legal restrictions are powerless
to deter racist abuses of the stop and frisk power is the basis for
Terry's refusal to impose a heightened standard. That contention
also underlies Terry's more fundamental position that no matter
how much we care about racial justice, our concern is irrelevant to
delineating the proper legal standard for stops and frisks.
Part IV provides a critical analysis of Terry's holding. It demon-
strates that Terry's empirical contention about the law's inevitable
28. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 80 (1966) ("In principle,
... [p]olice [d]epartments ... in America... are racially unbiased. That is, one would
not find in a training manual the idea that Blacks should be treated differently in the
criminal process than whites, nor even that Blacks are apt to exhibit greater criminal-
ity than whites. The explicit principle is racial equality.").
29. See Just Take Away Their Guns, supra note 2, at 47.
30. KANSAS CITY GUN EXPERIMENT, supra note 4, at 12.
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inefficacy against racist abuse of the stop and frisk power is
grounded in an unrealistic and overly simple model of police moti-
vation. Additionally, the contention is belied by studies of the ef-
fects of police department policies on the exercise of deadly force
and of the process by which the exclusionary rule deters abuses.
Part IV concludes that the Warren Court's world-weary realism in
holding against the application of a heightened standard for stops
and frisks was, in fact, highly unrealistic.
The contemporary implications of this critique are developed in
Part V, starting from the fact that now, as at the time of the Terry
decision in 1968, blacks are more likely to be stopped and frisked
than whites. Now, as then, there is seething resentment of police
practices-including stops and frisks-in some minority
communities. 3'
The analysis and critique of Terry's argument in Parts II-IV dem-
onstrates that contrary to the lack of concern evinced in Wilson's
and Sherman's recent proposals, racial impact should be taken into
account in both the legal and administrative delimitation of the
stop and frisk power. Part V argues, however, that a major gap in
our empirical knowledge must be remedied before racial impact
can properly be taken into account. In particular, we lack any well-
grounded estimate of the extent to which the racially disparate in-
cidence of stops and frisks is caused by police bias against blacks or
greater black criminality and corresponding police expertise in ap-
prehending those most likely to be involved in crime. The paucity
of existing empirical knowledge of the causes of the racially dispa-
rate incidence of stops and frisks makes it impossible to determine
whether the disparate impact in fact justifies any change in the
scope of the stop and frisk power. Much less does the requisite
empirical basis exist for deciding what types of heightened, racially
neutral limits the law or police department guidelines should im-
pose. Through criticizing existing studies, Part V suggests the sorts
of studies that are needed. This empirical work is not only neces-
sary if the law, police department guidelines and social policy are
to respond to the demands of racial justice and civil liberties, but
even if paramount importance is accorded to the fight against
crime. Accordingly, this Article concludes that neither Wilson's
31. See, e.g., Peter S. Canellos, Police Face a Confidence Gap Many Blacks Wor-
ried Officers Cover for Own, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 1995 at M21 (explaining that
"the ongoing mistrust of police in the black community... suggests that Boston, like
most urban areas, still has a racial gap when it comes to faith in law enforcement.").
1996]
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nor Sherman's lack of concern with racial impact can rightly be
considered part of a realistic approach to crime.
II. An Overview of Terry v. Ohio and Its Legal Legacy
Coming in 1968, the Supreme Court's opinion in Terry was the
product of a time of racial turbulence and rising fear of crime.
During the 1960s, cities burned in race riots and crime rates rose. 2
In 1964, "law and order" became an issue for the first time in a
Presidential campaign.33
Terry was the product of a social and legal climate that was
avowedly liberal. Representing this climate, President Lyndon
Johnson responded to the rise in crime and to the race riots with
the appointments of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice (the President's Commission)
and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the
Kerner Commission). The President's Commission issued its re-
port in 1967.34 The report, as well as taskforce reports and field
studies executed for the Commission, were referred to in both the
litigants' briefs and the Supreme Court's opinion in Terry.35 The
32. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 274, 450 (1993); JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW:
POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 75-80 (1993).
33. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 274; see generally Francis A. Allen, The
Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U.
ILL. L. FOR. 518, 539 ("That period [the late 1960's] was a time of social upheaval,
violence in the ghettos, and disorder on the campuses. Fears of the breakdown of
public order were widespread. Inevitably, the issue of law and order were [sic] politi-
cally exploited. In the presidential campaign of 1968 the bewildering problems of
crime in the United States were presented as a war between the 'peace forces' and the
'criminal forces.' "). For the suggestion that starting in the 1960's, racial and 'law and
order' concerns have been intertwined, see, e.g., John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershe-
nov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black
Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 560 n.8 (1991).
34. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
(1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT].
35. See id., referred to in Brief of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, as
Amicus Curiae [hereinafter Americans for Effective Law Enforcement Brief], re-
printed in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 20, at 515-16; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
POLICE 183-185 (1967)[hereinafter POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT], referred to in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11; in N.A.A.C.P. Brief, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 20, at 577, 578 n.2, 579 n.3, 581 n.7, 612, 612 n.61, 621 n.78, 637 n.99, 643
nn.108-109, 644; and in Americans for Effective Law Enforcement Brief, reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 20, at 516; POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT at 146-49,
referred to in N.A.A.C.P. Brief, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 639; DONALD
BLACK & ALBERT J. REISS, JR. 2 STUDIES IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
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report of the Kerner Commission was issued in March 1968,36 after
the briefing and oral argument in Terry were completed, but three
months before the Terry decision came down. Both Commissions
stressed that social and economic disadvantages were the primary,
if not sole, cause of disproportionate minority involvement in
crime and of riots in the ghettos. 37 The Commissions dwelt, more-
over, on the need to attend to police practices-including the ag-
gressive use of stops and frisks-that were a major cause of tension
between the police and minority communities and thereby them-
selves a cause of riots and crime.38
MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (Field Surveys III), Sec. 1 (Report of a Research
Study Submitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice, 1967), referred to in Americans for Effective Law Enforcement
Brief, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 20, at 516-17 and N.A.A.C.P. Brief,
reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 579 n.3, 581 n.7; ALBERT J. REISS, JR., 1 STUDIES
IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (Field Surveys
III) (Report of a Research Study Submitted to the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967), referred to in Americans for Ef-
fective Law Enforcement Brief, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 20, at
516.
36. See supra note 20.
37. See, e.g., the President's Commission: "The Commission is of the view that if
conditions of equal opportunity prevailed, the large differences now found between
the Negro and white arrest rates would disappear." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 35, at 45. Similarly, "[M]uch of American crime, delinquency, and
disorder is associated with ... : Poverty, racial antagonism, family breakdown or the
restlessness of young people. During the last 20 years these conditions have been
aggravated by such profound social changes as the technological and civil rights revo-
lutions, and the rapid decay of inner cities into densely packed, turbulent slums and
ghettos.
"It is in the cities that the conditions of life are the worst, that social tensions are
the most acute, that riots occur, that crime rates are the highest . . . ." Id. at 91.
Similar statements by the Kerner Commission include: "The background of disor-
der is often as complex and difficult to analyze as the disorder itself. But we find that
certain general conclusions can be drawn: Social and economic conditions in the riot
cities constituted a clear pattern of severe disadvantage for Negroes compared with
whites . . . ." KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 8. "White racism is
essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our
cities since the end of World War II. Among the ingredients of this mixture are:
.... The black ghettos, where segregation and poverty converge on the young to
destroy opportunity and enforce failure. Crime, drug addiction, dependency on wel-
fare, and bitterness and resentment against society in general and white society in
particular are the result." Id. at 10.
38. The President's Commission urged that "[pl]olice agencies cannot preserve the
public peace and control crime unless the public participates more fully than it now
does in law enforcement. Bad community feeling does more than create tensions and
engender actions against the police that in turn may embitter policemen and trigger
irrational responses from them. It stimulates crime." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 35, at 100. See also id. at 92. Similarly, the Police Task Force Report
noted, "[b]etween January 1964 and June 1966, 32 disturbances or riots occurred ....
Poor police-community relations, together with poor housing, unemployment and op-
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Framed by this background, the decision in Terry was a product
of the Warren Court, itself a primary symbol of 1960s liberalism.
Written by Chief Justice Earl Warren himself, the majority opinion
in Terry was joined by, among others, noted liberal justices Mar-
shall, Brennan and Fortas. Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter.
This liberal parentage notwithstanding, Terry limited the Warren
Court's previous expansion of the rights of criminal suspects. The
subject of Terry was street crime. 39 Specifically, a plainclothes po-
lice officer had observed Terry and another man pacing back and
pressive commercial practices, were basic underlying factors in those riots. In addi-
tion, more often than not, riots were set off by some quite ordinary and proper action
by a policeman. Some riots, however, started after improper or at least unwise police
conduct." POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 145. The Kerner Commis-
sion concluded that "The abrasive relationship between the police and the minority
communities has been a major-and explosive-source of grievance, tension and dis-
order . . . ." KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 17.
At the same time, the Police Task Force and Kerner Commission Reports both
argued that guidelines for the exercise of aggressive patrol techniques, including stops
and frisks, must be based on research on the impact of those techniques on police
relations with minority communities. The Police Task Force noted, "It is probably true
that an aggressive program of preventive patrol does reduce the amount of crime on
the street, although there has been no careful effort to measure the effectiveness of
this technique. It is also apparent, however, that aggressive preventive patrol contrib-
utes to the antagonism of minority groups whose members are subjected to it. A
basic issue, never dealt with explicitly by police, is whether, even solely from a law
enforcement point of view, the gain in law enforcement outweighs the cost of commu-
nity alienation.
"The continuation of field interrogation as a police investigative technique depends
upon a police willingness to develop policies which carefully distinguish field interro-
gation from clearly illegal street practices and to take administrative steps to demon-
strate that a proper field interrogation program can be carried out without it leading
also to indiscriminate stopping and searching of persons on the street. As yet, police
have failed to make this kind of demonstration. . ." POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 35, at 23. See also id. at 185 ("In order to balance the need for field inter-
rogations and the harmful effect on police-community relations which may result from
their indiscriminate use," both state legislatures and police departments need to de-
velop detailed guidelines on "the extent of police authority to stop and question
persons.").
Similarly, the Kerner Commission argued that, "Many police officers believe
strongly that there are law enforcement gains from such techniques [as aggressive
patrol]. However, these techniques can also have law enforcement liabilities [such as
minority disrespect of police]. Their employment should... be ... the product of a
deliberate balancing of pluses and minuses by command personnel.
".... The factors involved are difficult to weigh. Gains cannot be measured solely in
the number of arrests. Losses in police protection cannot be accepted solely because
of some vague gain in diminished community tension. The kind of thorough, objec-
tive assessment of police practices we need will require the best efforts of research
and development units within police departments, augmented if necessary by outside
research assistance." KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 306-07.
39. 392 U.S. at 4. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Terry majority begins:
"This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment
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forth in front of a store in downtown Cleveland in the middle of
the afternoon. Suspecting that the men were planning a robbery
and also fearing that they might have a gun, the officer ap-
proached, identified himself as a policeman, and requested their
names. When they mumbled in reply, the officer grabbed Terry,
patted down the outside of his clothing, and felt a pistol in the
breast pocket of his overcoat. The officer then removed the coat
and recovered the gun from the pocket. Terry was charged and
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.40
At issue before the United States Supreme Court were (i)
whether the stop and frisk of Terry violated the prohibitions on
illegal searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution4' and (ii) whether, as the "fruit" of a
Fourth Amendment violation, the gun therefore could not be used
as evidence for convicting Terry. 2 A broader issue of principle was
also involved. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Terry, a fun-
damental tenet of Fourth Amendment law was that government
officials can subject an individual or his or her property to a search
or seizure only if they have probable cause to believe that he or she
has committed or is committing a crime.43 Terry held that the
Fourth Amendment had not been violated even though stops and
frisks are properly classified as searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment and even though the officer's decision to stop
and frisk Terry was not based on probable cause.44 The Supreme
Court reached this holding by creating an exception to the prob-
able cause requirement. Instead of requiring probable cause, stops
and frisks are justified if they conform to a less stringent reason-
in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating
suspicious circumstances." Id.
40. 392 U.S. at 4-7.
41. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. 392 U.S. at 8, 12.
43. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964), and Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963), both citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949) ("Requiring more [than probable cause] would unduly hamper law enforce-
ment. Toallow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers'
whim or caprice.").
44. 392 U.S. at 16, 20.
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able suspicion standard.45 Under Terry's reasonable suspicion stan-
dard, an officer must have reason to believe that "criminal activity
is afoot" in order to stop the suspect, and reason to believe that the
suspect is "armed and presently dangerous" in order to frisk him. 46
The immediate consequence of the Supreme Court's reasoning
was that Terry's conviction was affirmed on the ground that his
stop and frisk had not violated the Fourth Amendment and that
the gun recovered from the frisk had therefore properly been used
45. 392 U.S. at 20, 27.
46. 392 U.S. at 24, 27-28, 30. The Terry majority explicitly declined -to decide
whether Terry had been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
before he was frisked. Accordingly, the majority only decided what the requisite jus-
tification was for a stop and frisk and did not reach the question of what justification
the Fourth Amendment required for a stop alone. Id. at 19 & 19 n.16. See also id. at
32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (criticizing the Terry majority for failing to recognize that
"if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a
citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to
make a forcible stop.") (emphasis -added).
By contrast, later cases have relied on the Terry majority's suggestion that while a
stop is justified by "reasonable suspicion" that "criminal activity may be afoot," a
frisk is justified only by "reasonable suspicion" that the suspect "may be armed and
presently dangerous." 392 U.S. at 30. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417 (1981) ("An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation
that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity," citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 16-19 (footnote and other citations omitted)); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 92-93 (1979) (a frisk of an individual must be "supported by a reasonable belief
that he [is] armed and presently dangerous," citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-24 (other
citation omitted)); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("So long as the of-
ficer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is
armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this pro-
tective purpose," citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (footnote omitted)).
The distinction between the requisite justifications for stops and frisks notwith-
standing, a frisk is virtually certain to be found necessary for protection and, hence,
justifiable whenever a stop is upheld. As Justice Harlan stated in his Terry
concurrence:
Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be immedi-
ate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspi-
cion of a crime of violence. ... There is no reason why an officer, rightfully
but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have
to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.
Id. at 33. See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 436 (1974) ("[H]ow can even the most enlightened and conscientious courts
ever fail to detect the presence of the necessary, indefinable less-than-probable-cause
probability of a weapon or, having thus justified the frisk, refuse to allow the police to
remove anything harder than a damp sponge which they will testify 'felt like' a
weapon?" (footnotes omitted)); N.A.A.C.P. Brief, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 20, at 593 ("Undoubtedly, a legislature might give the power to 'stop'
without accompanying power to 'frisk,' but all of the significant pieces of legislation
so far proposed or enacted couple 'stop' with 'frisk,' and the proponents of stop and
frisk seem unanimous that 'frisk' is necessary if 'stop' is to be effective." (footnote
omitted)).
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to convict him.47 More broadly, Terry weakened the rights of all
criminal defendants by broadening the admissibility of evidence
that could be used against them. As a result of Terry, a defendant
was no longer absolutely shielded, by the absence of probable
cause, from being convicted on the basis of evidence obtained from
a search and seizure. The evidence could be used so long as the
search and seizure was properly classified as a stop and frisk and so
long as the less stringent requirement of reasonable suspicion was
met.48
Terry did more than weaken the rights of criminal defendants,
however. Because Terry established that stops and frisks were ex-
empt from the traditional probable cause requirement and an offi-
cial's evidence of criminality would henceforth have to rise only to
the level of reasonable suspicion, Terry increased the likelihood
that innocent people would be stopped and frisked.49
In the years since 1968, the Terry exception has virtually swal-
lowed up the rule that probable cause is required for searches and
seizures.5° The Fourth Amendment's protection of the privacy of
both innocent people and those who commit crimes has thereby
been drastically reduced. Although Terry reasoned that stops and
frisks are governed by a weaker reasonable suspicion requirement
because they are less intrusive than the arrests and "full" searches
to which probable cause properly applies, 51 the Terry majority ex-
47. 392 U.S. at 30, 31.
48. 392 U.S. at 30-31.
49. For a similar argument, see N.A.A.C.P. Brief, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 20, at 580-83.
By granting police increased discretion under the Fourth Amendment, Terry also
made it more difficult for suspects to prevail in the civil actions seeking damages for
Fourth Amendment violations by federal and state agents that are respectively avail-
able under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
50. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 27, at 576-82; William J. Mertens, The Fourth
Amendment & the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 551, 617 (1984)
("The extension of Terry . . . threatens to hand the police new search and seizure
powers with little protection against discretionary abuse. The root problem is the
Terry Court's severance of the probable cause requirement from the Fourth Amend-
ment's reasonableness clause, which would, if pushed to its logical limit, allow all
searches and seizures not requiring a warrant to be judged under a balancing test
rather than traditional probable cause." (footnote omitted)); Scott E. Sundby, A Re-
turn to Fourth Amendment Basics, 72 MIrN. L. REv. 383, 385 (1988) (Terry "signifi-
cantly undermined the role of probable cause and set the stage for the long-term
expansion of the reasonableness balancing test without proper justification or limits").
51. 392 U.S. at 25-27.
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plicitly declined to define how intrusive a search or seizure can be
and yet count as a stop or frisk. 2
Moreover, Terry left open the practical question of what amount
and type of evidence would be necessary to justify a stop and
frisk. 3 The officer's decision to stop and frisk Terry was based on
observation of arguably suspicious activity. Terry and his compan-
ion paced back and forth, looking into the same store window 24
times.54 By contrast, subsequent decisions have established that
the reasonable suspicion requirement may be met even if a deci-
sion to stop or frisk is based in part on the suspect's personal char-
acteristics, rather than on his or her suspicious activity. Thus,
courts have held that race or ethnic appearance may be a factor,
52. Representative statements in Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Terry ma-
jority are: "[W]e turn our attention to the quite narrow question posed by the facts
before us: whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and
subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an
arrest. Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in
detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when he
confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him." 392 U.S. at 15-16; "We need
not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the Fourth Amend-
ment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons. These limitations will
have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases." Id. at
29 (citation omitted).
Subsequent cases, however, have pronounced increasingly invasive police actions to
be mere "Terry stops," and thus subject only to Terry's reasonableness requirement
rather than probable cause. Thus, the Terry majority repeatedly observed that the
stop and frisk of Terry was less intrusive than an arrest or full search because of its
brevity. 392 U.S. at 25, 26. However, in United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that there was no "hard-and-fast time limit for a permis-
sible Terry stop[,]" 470 U.S. at 686 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709
n.10 (1983)), and advised courts to defer to officers' assessments of law enforcement
needs. Id.
The Sharpe Court acknowledged that too lengthy an intrusion might amount to a de
facto arrest. "Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point
it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop." Id. at 685. However, the Court
emphasized "the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the
stop," and warned that, in determining whether the permissible time had been ex-
ceeded, "the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing " of police deci-
sions. Id. at 685-86.
Subsequent cases establish, moreover, that a Terry stop may include a considerable
display of physical force. Thus, although Terry was frisked by a single officer who
apparently did not display a weapon, 392 U.S. at 7, 28, 29, courts commonly find that
people surrounded by multiple officers with drawn guns are subject to Terry stops,
rather than arrests. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir.
1992); United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Jones,
759 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985).
53. "Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts." 392
U.S. at 30.
54. Id. at 22-23.
HIDDEN RACISM
although not the sole factor, establishing reasonable suspicion.5 In
1989 in United States v. Sokolow, the Supreme Court held, more-
over, that drug profiles may be relied on to establish reasonable
suspicion.5 6 These profiles, first developed by the federal Drug En-
forcement Agency in the mid-1970s, are supposed to guide law en-
forcement officers in selecting people to suspect of being drug
couriers and consequently to question or otherwise surveil at air-
port terminals. Among the personal characteristics included in
drug profiles are whether a person is nervous or too calm, seated in
the middle or back of a airplane, or travelling to or from a "source
city" for drugs.5 7
Through these expansive definitions of what counts as a Terry
stop and as reasonable suspicion, the courts' post-Terry decisions
have massively relaxed Fourth Amendment protections. Within
both the Supreme Court and the broader legal community, there
has been impassioned debate about the extent to which this relaxa-
tion follows from the logic of Terry. 8 It is indisputable, however,
55. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States
v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1431 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25
F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994); Anderson, 923 F.2d at 455; Dean, 543 P.2d at 427.
For discussion and criticism of the cases establishing that race may be a factor in
establishing reasonable suspicion, see, e.g., Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a
Suspect, supra note 20, passim; Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1500-1518;
Williams, supra note 27, at 576-77, 582-87. I discuss these cases more fully infra note
90 and text accompanying notes 89-93.
56. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
57. See, e.g., id. at 13-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing factors in drug
profiles and criticizing the profiles' "chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular
set of observations"); United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 716-17 (7th Cir.
1994) (describing factors in a drug profile and questioning their probativity in regard
to crime); Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1502-03.
58. For disagreement within the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 38-39
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Only [probable cause] draws a meaningful distinction be-
tween an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer's personal
knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the person seized has com-
mitted, is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime .... To give the police
greater power.., is to take a long step down the totalitarian path .... [I]f the individ-
ual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not
like the cut of his jib, if they can 'seize' and 'search' him in their discretion, we enter a
new regime."); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 509 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("The scope of a Terry-type 'investigative' stop and any attendant search must be
extremely limited or the Terry exception would 'swallow the general rule that Fourth
Amendment seizures [and searches] are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause'
.... [A]ny suggestion that the Terry reasonable-suspicion standard justifies anything
but the briefest of detentions or the most limited of searches finds no support in the
Terry line of cases.") (citation omitted); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 154 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In today's decision the Court ignores the fact that Terry
begrudgingly accepted the necessity for creating an exception from the warrant re-
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that Terry provided the framework for the relaxation. Before
Terry, Fourth Amendment law included only a bipartite division
between searches and seizures for which probable cause is re-
quired, and official actions which do not count as searches and
seizures and hence are not protected'by the Fourth Amendment.59
Had this division continued, it would have been impossible to de-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment and treats this case as if warrantless searches
were the rule rather than the 'narrowly, drawn' exception. This decision betrays the
careful balance that Terry sought to strike between a citizen's right to privacy and his
government's responsibility for effective law enforcement . . . ."). Compare United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 714 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Terry, and the
cases that followed it, permit only brief investigative stops and extremely limited
searches based on reasonable suspicion. They do not provide the police with a com-
mission to employ whatever investigative techniques they deem appropriate.") with
id. at 720 ("Justice Douglas was the only dissenter in Terry. He stated that 'It]here
have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on
the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper
hand.' Today, the Court uses Terry as a justification for submitting to those pres-
sures." (citation omitted)).
For scholarly disagreement on whether subsequent "Terry stop" cases have been
true to Terry's intent, see, e.g., Tracey Macin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion:
The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1328 (1990); Wil-
liams, supra note 27, at 576-82 (subsequent Supreme Court decisions broke Terry's
promises by not according due weight to individual privacy interests); Mertens, supra
note 50, at 589, 591. For scholarly arguments that subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions broke Terry's promises by not according due weight to individual privacy inter-
ests or requiring sufficiently vigorous judicial review, see, e.g., Williams, supra note 27,
at 576-82; and Maclin, 75 CORNELL L. REV. at 1328. For the opposing contention that
subsequent "Terry stop" cases have been true to Terry's intent, see, e.g., Sunby, supra
note 50, at 399 ("The Court in Camera and Terry embraced the reasonableness bal-
ancing test in a manner that conceptually weakened probable cause and failed to pro-
vide any long-term guidance or limits for the future role of reasonableness."), and
Mertens, supra note 50, at 589, 591.
59. See cases cited supra note 43. In its amicus brief in Terry, the N.A.A.C.P. dis-
tinguished between the traditional bipartite model and the tripartite model advocated
by proponents of stop and frisk. N.A.A.C.P. Brief, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 20, at 588-96. In particular, the N.A.A.C.P. stated that:
The Classical Arrest-Search Model thus recognizes two categories of police
investigative powers. Powers whose exercise does not significantly invade
personal liberty and the right of privacy ... are given the police to use at
large, indiscriminately, at their discretion, and without judicial supervision.
Powers whose exercise does invade these rights may be used by the police
... only against persons whom there is probable cause, to believe are crimi-
nal actors .... The 'probable cause' determination made by a policeman as
the precondition of the exercise of these powers is judicially reviewable ....
In theory, the Stop-Frisk Model differs from the Classical Arrest-Search
Model in that it recognizes at least three, perhaps more, categories of police
powers.
Id. at 590-91 (footnotes omitted). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 105 (1979)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The petitioner in Terry had sought ... a model allowing
the police to search some individuals completely and other individuals not at all.").
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crease Fourth Amendment protections by broadening the class of
searches and seizures not subject to probable cause. It would also
have been impossible to weaken the Fourth Amendment by gradu-
ally reducing the stringency of an intermediate reasonableness re-
quirement. In short, by dissolving the traditional bipartite scheme,
Terry created powerful tools for the legal expansion of law enforce-
ment powers.
III. The Ambivalent Argument of Terry v. Ohio
A. The Invasiveness of Stops and Frisks and Violent Crime.
The majority opinion in Terry is two-sided. It eloquently decries
the threats that the stop and frisk power poses to individual dignity
and race relations only to insist repeatedly that the probable cause
standard must nonetheless be lowered. Thus, the opinion ridicules
the view that a stop and frisk is "a mere 'minor inconvenience and
petty indignity', ' 60 but insists that stops and frisks are nonetheless
less invasive than the arrests and "full" searches to which probable
cause properly applies. 61. The opinion's eloquence about the threat
that stops and frisks pose to individual privacy pales beside its im-
passioned description of the threat that violent criminals pose to
police officers. Citing figures on the numbers of police officers
killed and wounded in the line of duty from 1960-1966,62 the opin-
ion proclaims: "American criminals have a long tradition of armed
violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement of-
ficers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are
wounded. ' 63 The opinion urges that because officers need to be
able to protect themselves while investigating crime, they need not
wait for probable cause before subjecting individuals to the "far
from inconsiderable" intrusion of a frisk for weapons.'
60. People v. Rivera, 201 N.E. 2d 32, 36 (N.Y. 1964). Chief Justice Warren de-
scribes the Rivera court's view in Terry, 392 U.S. at 10-11, and dismisses the view, id.
at 16-20.
In particular, Warren cites a scholarly description of frisks as including "[a] thor-
ough search of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet." 392 U.S. at 17
n.13 (quoting PRIAR & MARTIN, SEARCHING AND DISARMING CRIMINALS, 45 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954).
61. Id. at 25-27.
62. Id. at 24 n.21.
63. Id at 23.
64. Id. at 24, 26. In work in progress, I show that this argument for the need to
grant police power to frisk on less than probable cause is based on major and empiri-
cally questionable transformations of the facts briefed and argued to the United
States Supreme Court. See Adina Schwartz, Who's the We?: Relations among the
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B. The Acceptance of the N.A.A.C.P.'s Premisses and
Rejection of Its Conclusion.
The Terry majority's rejection of an across-the-board probable
cause requirement was based, in addition, on an ambivalent posi-
tion on race relations. The N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund had submitted an amicus brief to the United States
Supreme Court purporting to represent the many innocent people
whose cases do not come to court because nothing incriminating is
found when they are stopped and frisked.65 The brief spoke of the
innocent victims as "Everyman",66 but nonetheless emphasized
that all innocent citizens were not equally likely to be stopped and
frisked. Instead, the N.A.A.C.P. claimed that blacks were more
likely to be stopped and frisked than whites,67 and that racial preju-
dice on the part of the police was a major, if not sole, cause of the
disparate impact.68 In addition, the N.A.A.C.P. urged that the ra-
Citizenry, Criminal Defendants and the Police, Presentation at the 46th Annual Meet-
ing of the American Society of Criminology (Nov. 11, 1994) (transcript on file with
the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
65. The N.A.A.C.P. stated that it wished to represent "[t]he many thousands of
our citizens who have been or may be stopped and frisked yearly, only to be released
when the police find them innocent of any crime .... N.A.A.C.P. Brief, supra note
20, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 580-81.
66. For example, the N.A.A.C.P. stated that "the Court is now asked for the first
time to legitimate criminal investigative activity that significantly intrudes upon the
privacy of individuals who are undifferentiable from Everyman as the probable perpe-
trators of a crime." Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS 586-88. Similarly, "amicus
curiae wishes to speak principally in behalf of their interests-which we conceive to
be indistinguishable (but for the vagaries of a 'reasonable suspicion') from those of
the citizenry generally." Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 583; see also id, re-
printed in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 634.
67. For the N.A.A.C.P.'s tendency to slide between equating the innocents whom
it purported to represent with "Everyman" and with black victims of racism, see, e.g.,
id., reprinted in Landmark BRIEFS at 615-616 ("[A]s to what citizen is it not reason-
ably possible that he has committed some crime? As to what unknown citizen on the
street (even a crowded street) near the scene of a known crime? As to what group of
iU-dressed young men on a ghetto street corner? As to what Negro abroad on the
streets in a 'white' neighborhood late in the day?").
68. Thus, the N.A.A.C.P. wrote, "A central purpose of the Fund is the legal eradi-
cation of practices in our society that bear with discriminatory harshness upon Ne-
groes and upon the poor, deprived, and friendless, who too often are Negroes. The
stop and frisk procedure.., is such a practice. The evidence is weighty and uncontra-
dicted that stop and frisk power is employed by the police most frequently against the
inhabitants of our inner cities, racial minorities and the underprivileged. This is no
historical accident or passing circumstance. The essence of stop and frisk doctrine is
the sanctioning of judicially uncontrolled and uncontrollable discretion by law en-
forcement officers. History, and not in this country alone, has taught that such discre-
tion comes inevitably to be used as an instrument of oppression of the unpopular. It
was so in the case of the search and seizure practices which the Fourth Amendment
was written to condemn. We believe that the Amendment protects the unpopular, the
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cist misuse of stops and frisks was a major cause of the tension
between police and minority communities. 69
The N.A.A.C.P.'s empirical contentions were controversial. In
their amicus brief, the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement
(The Law Enforcement) explicitly argued that disproportionate mi-
nority involvement in crime, rather than police racial prejudice,
might explain the disparate incidence of stops and frisks.70 The
brief relied, in particular, on Black and Reiss's finding, in their
field survey for the President's Commission, that "Personal
searches on Negroes are over twice as productive of weapons as are
those conducted on whites. In on-view situations one-in-five frisks
of a Negro yielded a gun; for whites the proportion was one-in-
ten.",71
The Law Enforcement brief failed to indicate, however, that de-
spite their finding of greater yields from frisks of blacks, Black and
Reiss nonetheless concluded that blacks were more likely than
whites to be illegally frisked.72 On the one hand, according to
Negro, and all our citizens alike, from subjection to the oppressive police discretion
which stop and frisk embodies." N.A.A.C.P. Brief, supra note 20, reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS at 579-80. Similarly, "[T]he man likely to be stopped [is] the man
on the street in a 'bad' neighborhood, the man in the ghetto. .. ." Id., reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS at 611; "This suspicious cast of mind is intensified in the ghetto.
The policeman on patrol in the inner city has little understanding of the way of life of
the people he observes, and he believes (with considerable justification) that they are
hostile to him. The result is inevitable. The patrolman ... has come to identify the
black man with danger. Little wonder that field interrogations are sometimes used in
a way which discriminates against minority groups, the poor, and the juvenile." Id.,
reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 44-45 (citations omitted), reprinted in LANDMARK
BRIEFS at 620-21. See also id. at 64-66, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 640-42.
69. Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 638. See id., reprinted in LANDMARK
BRIEFS at 636-45.
70. Americans for Effective Law Enforcement Brief, supra note 34, reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS at 515-17.
71. Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 517, citing BLACK & REISS, supra note
34, at 86. Under Black and Reiss's definition, an " 'on-view' mobilization" occurs
"[w]hen an officer initiates contact and reports on an incident that occurs in his pres-
ence". Id. at 4.
The N.A.A.C.P. Brief, supra note 20, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS at 581 n.7,
indicated that other studies in the 1960s reported much lower yields from stops and
frisks than those Black and Reiss found. In comparing the Black and Reiss study with
other studies discussed in this article, it is important to note that the Black and Reiss
figure concerns the yield from only those stops that culminate in frisks. By contrast,
the figures from Sherman's Kansas City gun experiment, supra notes 4, 9-10 and ac-
companying text, Bogomolny's 1976 study, infra text surrounding notes 198-205,
Piliavin and Briar's 1964 study, infra text surrounding notes 207-212, and Smith's 1981
London study, infra note 219, concern the yield from stops that both did and did not
lead to suspects being frisked.
72. See BLACK & REISS, supra note 35.
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Black and Reiss, "[t]he legality of the personal search depends
upon necessity for self-protection if it is not 'incident to' an arrest
and if permission is not asked and received. ' 73 On the other hand,
"[o]bservers in on-view encounters judged frisks necessary for the
officer's protection less often when Negroes than whites were
searched. '74 Moreover, "[i]n on-views, Negroes were, asked [for
permission to frisk] in 8 percent of the cases compared to 11 per-
cent for whites. 75
Black and Reiss's racial comparisons were not mentioned in the
reports of either the President's Commission, its Police Taskforce
or the Kerner Commission. As the N.A.A.C.P., the Police
Taskforce and the Kerner Commission both explicitly argued that
blacks were subject to significant abuse of the stop and frisk power
and that this was a major source of explosive tension in minority
communities. 76 In contrast to the N.A.A.C.P., however, the Ker-
ner Commission did not consider whether such abuse was the re-
sult of racial prejudice or greater than in other communities. The
Police Taskforce explicitly argued that it was difficult to determine
the extent to which decisions to stop and frisk blacks were moti-
vated by racial prejudice or greater black criminality.77
73. Id. at 82.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 85. Black and Reiss concluded that the higher frequency of illegal frisks
of blacks was a predictable result of the great discretion that officers enjoyed in on-
view encounters, and that this exercise of police discretion might in turn be explained
by either discrimination or by disproportionate black criminality, "Assuming that po-
lice discretion is greater in the on-view encounter, it could also be assumed that of-
ficers will exercise that discretion more often with Negroes than whites (whether on
grounds of a higher crime rate for Negroes than whites in these cities or on grounds of
discrimination, or some other basis)." Id.
76. The Task Force wrote that, "Misuse of field interrogations .... is causing seri-
ous friction with minority groups in many communities. This is becoming particularly
true as more police departments adopt 'aggressive patrol' in which officers are en-
couraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street who are unknown to
them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not sufficiently evi-
dent." POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 184.
Similar statements by the Kerner Commission include, "[M]any departments have
adopted patrol practices which ... have 'replaced harassment by individual patrolmen
with harassment by entire departments'." KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
20, at 303.
The Police Taskforce and Kerner Commission agreed that abusive stops and frisks
were a cause of poor relations between the police and minority communities. None-
theless, they both called for research into the precise impact of aggressive patrol tech-
niques, including stops and frisks, on police-community relations, see supra note 37
and surrounding discussion.
77. "[M]embers of minority groups... generally believe ... that discrimination is
practiced against both middle class and poor persons from minority groups .... It is
extremely difficult to establish the extent to which such allegations are accurate since
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This controversy notwithstanding, the Terry majority opinion
adopts the N.A.A.C.P.'s view that stops and frisks are used as a
means of racial harassment. 78 The opinion speaks of "[t]he whole-
sale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of
which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently com-
plain."' 79 Leaving no doubt that they credit these complaints, the
majority cites the Police Taskforce Report to the effect that
"'[m]isuse of field interrogations' increases 'as more police depart-
ments adopt 'aggressive patrol'., ''80 Moreover, the opinion as-
serts that this abuse of the stop and frisk power is "a major source
of friction between the police and minority communities. 81
Terry incorporates these empirical contentions about racial im-
pact, however, only to reject the N.A.A.C.P.'s legal conclusion.
The N.A.A.C.P. had argued that because of the danger of racist
misuse, stops and frisks are properly subject, as all other searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, to the probable cause
standard. The Terry opinion, however, emphatically denies that
any such conclusion follows from the fact that stops and frisks are
used to harass members of minority groups. The opinion entones
that across-the-board enforcement of the probable cause standard
would be a mere "futile protest ' 82 against racial harassment, a
practice which "it can never be used effectively to control. '83
Moreover, the opinion claims that this "futile protest" would be
costly. Invoking the spectre of criminal violence, the majority
warns that a "high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to
prevent crime" may result if police are not allowed to stop and
frisk on less than probable cause.84
discrimination is likely to be only one of several factors which affect an officer's deci-
sion in any particular situation. Negroes ... are arrested and probably stopped in
disproportion to their numbers. However, these groups frequently live in high-crime
areas. Consequently, normal, completely fair police work would doubtless produce
the arrest or stopping of larger numbers of these groups." POLICE TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 35, at 183.
78. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 14 n.11, quoting POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 184.
81. Id.; see also id. at 17 n.14, referring to "the abusive practices which play a
major, though by no means exclusive, role in creating this friction."
82.' Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
83. Id.
84. Id.
1996]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
C. The Marginalization of Racial Concerns.
Notwithstanding this rejection of the N.A.A.C.P.'s argument for
a stringent legal standard, the Terry majority nonetheless insists
that a court must find a Fourth Amendment violation if a particular
defendant shows that a stop or frisk was used as a means of racial
harassment.85 This limited legal role for facts about the racial inci-
dence and motivation of stops and frisks is grounded in a distinc-
tion between deterring future violations and condemning past
violations. On the one hand, the Terry majority argues that legal
restrictions are powerless to deter racist abuses of the stop and
frisk power, but can by contrast deter legitimate law enforcement
efforts. Accordingly, neither the extent nor the causes of racial dis-
parity in the incidence of stops and frisks is relevant to defining the
proper, racially neutral extent of the stop and frisk power. In other
words, racial impact has no bearing on the choice between prob-
able cause and the more lenient reasonable suspicion standard that
Terry propounds. On the other hand, the underlying racial motiva-
tion for a particular stop and frisk is relevant because courts are
still responsible for condemning "identified" instances of racist
abuse.86 While dismissing a heightened Fourth Amendment stan-
dard as a "futile protest" against police racism,87 the Terry majority
nonetheless proclaims that "courts still retain their traditional re-
sponsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or
harassing .... When such conduct is identified, it must be con-
demned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evi-
dence in criminal trials. '88
As stated above, subsequent cases established that race may be a
factor, although not the sole factor, establishing reasonable suspi-
cion for a stop or frisk.89 Moreover, once an officer advances a
nonracial justification for a decision to stop or frisk, courts have
tended not to ask whether race was in fact the sole basis for the
decision.90 These legal developments are consonant with Terry's
85. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
86. See generally, Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
87. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
88. Id.
89. See cases and articles cited supra note 55.
90. See, e.g., Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at 1493 (McKay, C.J., dissenting) ("the ma-
jority's undue reliance on Brignoni-Ponce will essentially allow any Hispanic in the
southern half of New Mexico to be pulled over without restraint"); Anderson, 923
F.2d at 455; Dean, 543 P.2d at 427 (1975); see discussion supra at note 20.
For criticism of courts' tendency not to probe into the racial basis of officers' deci-
sions, see Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1501-02 ("As a general proposi-
tion, courts resist scrutinizing the incremental decisions leading up to detentions,
340
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position that courts are powerless to deter racist stops and frisks.91
Because it follows that even the most exacting judicial inquiry into
the racial basis of particular decisions will not deter officers from
future racist abuses, scrutiny cannot be justified by its likely effects
on future police conduct.
Nor is a firm foundation for probing scrutiny provided by Terry's
insistence that despite their inability to deter, courts remain re-
sponsible for condemning racist abuses. If deterrence is impossi-
ble, one of the strongest reasons for requiring judicial
condemnation is that an independent harm occurs when courts an-
nounce to the public that illegal conduct is acceptable. Courts are
more likely to perpetrate this harm by approving of stops or frisks
for which race is clearly the sole basis than by failing to scrutinize
plausible nonracial pretexts. Given the consequent lesser impor-
tance of condemning officers' surreptitious reliance on race, it is
not surprising that, despite the appeal to a "judicial integrity" ra-
tionale for condemning racial abuses, the Terry majority fails to as-
sign courts proactive responsibility for rooting out police racism.
Instead, the opinion speaks of courts' reactive responsibility to
condemn racial abuses "[w]hen such conduct is identified."92 This
reactive view is in turn consonant with later courts' tendency to
abstain from asking whether the nonracial justifications that of-
ficers present for stops and frisks are in fact pretextual.93
insisting on a Gestalt-like fourth amendment analysis that looks to the totality of the
circumstances .... This approach has allowed courts to validate the use of race so
long as the totality of the circumstances includes nonracial factors."), and more gener-
ally, at 1501-04.
But see Gonzalez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 22 F.3d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that
because "[t]he other factors that [the officer] used to justify his decision to stop...
had such a low probative value that no reasonable officer would have relied on them
to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop,"
suspect's Hispanic appearance was illegally relied on as the sole basis for the stop);
Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d at 716-17 (7th Cir. 1994) (because of strong correlation
between being Hispanic and other "suspicious" factors in drug profile, reasonable
suspicion was not established by suspect's match to profile); Developments in the Law,
supra note 20, at 1503 n.54 (citing cases in which courts have disapproved of the use of
race as a factor in criminal profiles).
91. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.
92. 392 U.S. at 15.
93. This is compatible with Johnson's contention, supra note 20, at 257-58, that if
courts took the task of being models of integrity seriously, they would be committed
to rooting out racism root and branch. My point here is that judicial integrity is much
more obviously violated when courts condone flagrant abuses than when they fail to
expose and condemn concealed abuses. Thus, if the commitment to judicial integrity
is not precisely defined, but rather vaguely alluded to as in Terry, that very commit-
ment can support a tendency not to consider whether purported nonracial justifica-
tions are in fact pretextual.
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Moreover, Terry's reasoning paved the way for subsequent case
law establishing that even if race is the sole basis for an intrusion,
the Fourth Amendment is not necessarily violated. 4  The
N.A.A.C.P. had argued, in effect, that facts about racial impact are
relevant to determining what sort of justification the Fourth
Amendment requires for particular types of intrusions. 5  Terry's
rejection of this argument went hand in hand with the position that
the Fourth Amendment standards for particular types of intrusions
are to be arrived at by balancing relevant governmental interests
against the privacy interests of individuals.96 This position under-
lies the Supreme Court's contrasting decisions in 1975 in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce97 and in 1976 in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte.9
8
At issue in both cases was whether the Fourth Amendment was
violated when, on the basis of ethnic appearance alone, agents of
the United States Border Patrol stopped occupants of vehicles for
questioning near the Mexican border. In Brignoni-Ponce, the stops
were conducted by roving patrols. 99 Relying on Terry, the Court
94. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-564 (1976);
United States v. Ojebode, 957 F.2d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1992)(Given absence of rea-
sonable suspicion requirement for border stops, Nigerian defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment rights were not violated even if "his detention by the Customs' inspectors was
motivated by his race and nationality"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1291 (1993). Although
this line of cases is discussed and criticized in Developments in the Law, supra note 20,
at 1504-05 & n.58, 1507, the authors fail to recognize that the line is rooted in Terry's
rejection of the N.A.A.C.P.'s position.
95. See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 20, at 579-580.
96. 392 U.S. at 21-22, 24, 26, 27. A conflicting interpretation might seem to follow
from the statement, in footnote 14 of the Terry majority opinion, that "the degree of
community resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assess-
ment of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security
caused by those practices." 392 U.S. at 17 n.14. The seeming implication is that as a
particular police practice (such as stops and frisks) exacerbates racial tensions, the
balance between governmental and privacy interests may alter so as to give rise to
more stringent Fourth Amendment standards for the exercise of that practice.
The preceding sentence in footnote 14 precludes this implication, however, at least
in regard to stops and frisks. Referring back to his argument for the futility of seeking
to control racist abuse of the stop and frisk power by imposing a heightened Fourth
Amendment standard, Chief Justice Warren states that:
We have noted that the abusive practices which play a major, though by no
means exclusive, role in creating this friction [between the police and minor-
ity communities] are not susceptible of control by means of the exclusionary
rule, and cannot properly dictate our decision with respect to the powers of
the police in genuine investigative and preventive situations.
Id.
97. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
98. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
99. 422 U.S. at 882.
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reasoned that the governing Fourth Amendment standard was to
be determined by balancing the governmental interests in prevent-
ing the entry of illegal aliens and placing conditions on the legal
entry of aliens against the invasion of individual privacy occasioned
by roving patrol stops.100 The Court went on to hold that the "bal-
ance between the public interest and the individual's right to per-
sonal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers"'' 1
showed that individualized suspicion was required for roving patrol
stops. 10 2 In other words, roving patrol stops are justified under the
Fourth Amendment only if there is reason to suspect that the par-
ticular people .stopped are illegal aliens. On this basis, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment was violated when roving patrols
stopped individuals on the basis of Mexican appearance alone. 0 3
Although Mexican appearance was relevant to establishing reason-
able suspicion of illegal alienage, it could not by itself provide the
requisite reason to suspect that a particular person was an illegal
alien.104
By contrast, a year later the Supreme Court held, in Martinez-
Fuente, that even if people were stopped at fixed checkpoints on
the basis of Mexican appearance alone, the Fourth Amendment
would not be violated.10 5 Again relying on Terry, the Court rea-
soned that the Fourth Amendment standard for fixed checkpoint
stops depended on "weigh[ing] the public interest against the
Fourth Amendment interest of the individual.' 1 6 The Court then
distinguished Brignoni-Ponce away on the ground that roving pa-
trol stops were more intrusive than stops at fixed checkpoints.
0 7
100. Id at 878-84.
101. Id at 878.
102. Id. at 881-84, 886-87.
103. Id. at 885-86.
104. The Court reasoned that:
In this case, the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respon-
dent's car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants .... [T]his factor
alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they were aliens, nor a
reasonable belief that the car concealed other aliens who were illegally in
the country. Large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the
border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. The likelihood
that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify
stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.
Id. at 885-87 (footnotes omitted).
105. 428 U.S. at 563-64.
106. Id at 555.
107. Id. at 558-560.
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On this basis, the Court held that the balance between government
and individual interests did not require "individualized suspicion"
for stops at fixed checkpoints, as opposed to stops by roving
patrols.1 °8
Whether the Fourth Amendment requires that a particular type
of intrusion be justified by individualized suspicion is a question of
what the proper, racially neutral standard is. In Martinez-Fuerte,
the Court applied the racially neutral standard that individualized
suspicion is not required to hold that a proper stop could be made,
even where Mexican appearance is the sole reason for a particular
person's being stopped at a fixed checkpoint. On the reasoning of
Brignoni-Ponce, the vice in exclusive reliance is that Mexican ap-
pearance cannot by itself provide the requisite individualized suspi-
cion for a roving patrol stop.109 Since, according to Martinez-
Fuerte, "no particularized reason need exist to justify [a fixed
checkpoint stop]," the vice would not arise from fixed checkpoint
stops based on Mexican appearance alone.110
108. Id. at 562.
109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. 428 U.S. 563-64. The Court's reasoning is worth quoting at length:
[I]t is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to the secondary inspec-
tion area at the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that would
not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if it be assumed that such refer-
rals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive
no constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at
885-87. As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized
reason need exist to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted
for the brief questioning involved.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
By considering only whether "a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers' requests and terminate the encounter", the Supreme Court more recently
held, in Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386-89 (1991), that an individual may be
stopped and questioned aboard a bus as part of a drug interdiction program without
being "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Since such intrusions
may accordingly not be subject to Fourth Amendment requirements, no quantum of
suspicion may be needed to justify them. Id. at 2386.
In dissent, Justice Marshall charged that race was the principal, if not sole, basis for
drug interdiction agents' decisions to question particular people. Id. at 2390 n.1
("[T]he basis of the decision to single out particular passengers during a suspicionless
[drug interdiction] sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than unspeakable [reliance
on race]."). See also People v. Evans, 556 N.Y.S. 794, 799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (criti-
cizing Port Authority Police Department drug interdiction program on the ground
that "[m]inorities did not fight their way up from the back of the bus just to be rou-
tinely stopped and interrogated on their way through the terminal."). The legacy of
Terry and Martinez-Fuente, however, is that neither the extent nor the cause(s) of
racially disparate incidence has any bearing on what the Fourth Amendment stan-
dard for a particular type of intrusion is. Thus, once, as in Martinez-Fuente and Bos-
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This reasoning would not have been possible had the
N.A.A.C.P.'s position in Terry prevailed. The governing Fourth
Amendment standards for particular types of intrusions (including
roving patrol and fixed checkpoint stops) would not have de-
pended solely on the balance between governmental and individual
interests. In addition, it would have been necessary to consider
likely racial disparities in the incidence of particular types of intru-
sions under particular standards. It would also have been neces-
sary to consider whether and to what extent such disparities are
likely to result from police racial bias or police expertise in appre-
hending those most likely to be involved in crime.111
tick, the balance of individual and government interests is determined not to require
any justification for subjecting particular individuals to a particular type of intrusion,
the racial motivation for such an intrusion is irrelevant, from the point of view of the
Fourth Amendment.
In reaction to the Bostick Court's failure to take account of the racial ramifications
of drug interdiction programs, several commentators have proposed that the Fourth
Amendment standards for particular types of intrusions vary with the race of those
subject to the intrusions. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 25; Macin, supra note 27. This
article's suggestion, to the contrary, is that the extent and causes of the racially dispa-
rate incidence of a particular type of intrusion is relevant to determining a single,
racially neutral standard for that intrusion.
111. In his dissent in Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for
failing to take account of racial impact. Brennan failed to acknowledge, however,
that he and the other members of the Terry majority had explicitly concluded that
such considerations are irrelevant to the choice of Fourth Amendment standards.
Brennan's dissent states that:
[T]he Court, without explanation.... ignores one major source of vexation.
In abandoning any requirement of a minimum of reasonable suspicion, or
even articulable suspicion, the Court in every practical sense renders mean-
ingless, as applied to checkpoint stops, the Brignoni-Ponce holding that
"standing alone [Mexican appearance] does not justify stopping all Mexican-
Americans to ask if they are aliens." Since the objective is almost entirely
the Mexican illegally in the country, checkpoint officials, uninhibited by any
objective standards and therefore free to stop any or all motorists without
explanation or excuse, wholly on whim, will perforce target motorists of
Mexican appearance. The process will then inescapably discriminate against
citizens of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for
no other reason than that they unavoidably possess the same "suspicious"
physical and grooming characteristics of illegal Mexican aliens.
428 U.S. at 571-72 (citation and footnote omitted).
The authors of Developments in the Law similarly argue that racial impact, and not
simply the balance between individual and governmental interests, is relevant to the
delineation of Fourth Amendment standards. Developments in the Law, supra note
20, at 1507 ("Under modem fourth amendment theory, judicial scrutiny heightens in
relation to the severity of the harm suffered by the subject where the harm is defined
exclusively in terms of the citizen's interest in being free from intrusive state action
.... This framework permits courts to diminish scrutiny where the intrusion is margi-
nal, but where the racial discrimination might be significant."). Similar to Justice
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D. Misunderstandings of the Legacy of Terry v. Ohio.
A complete analysis of the relationship between Terry and later
decisions on the role of race in Fourth Amendment law is beyond
the scope of this Article. The foregoing analysis shows, however,
that the legacy of Terry has been widely misunderstood. In particu-
lar, it is at most a half-truth that by failing to consider "the racial
implications of police conduct," subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions have "broken [the] promises" of Terry." 2 As this Article ex-
plains, the Terry majority adopted the N.A.A.C.P.'s empirical
contentions about the extent and causes of racial disparity in the
incidence of stops and frisks only to conclude that such considera-
tions are irrelevant to delineating the proper standard for stops and
frisks. Terry's reasoning for this conclusion arguably paved the
way for later courts' tendency not to probe into racial motivation
so long as an officer cites some nonracial factor to justify a particu-
lar stop or frisk. The reasoning in Terry also laid the foundation for
the Supreme Court subsequently to conclude that unless individu-
alized suspicion is required by the balance of governmental and
individual interests, the Fourth Amendment is not violated by in-
trusions based on race or ethnic appearance alone."13
It is a mistake, nonetheless, to conclude without argument that
"Terry v. Ohio may have been incorrectly decided. Given who the
police are and their lack of training to break down color-based
stereotyping, Terry may grant the police too much power to dis-
criminate.' 1 4 The irony is that Terry's consideration of racial im-
pact itself implies that no matter how much we care about racial
justice, facts about racial impact provide no reason for legal limits
on police discretion to stop or frisk.' 5 The Terry majority argued
that legal restrictions can do nothing to curb racist abuses, but can
by contrast deter legitimate law enforcement efforts." 6 If this is
correct, neither the extent nor the causes of racial disparity are rel-
evant to the law's racially neutral definition of the extent of the
stop and frisk power." 7 It is necessary, then, to examine Terry's
Brennan's dissent in Martinez-Fuerte, these authors totally ignore the explicit argu-
ment in Terry, for the irrelevance of such racial concerns.
112. Williams,supra note 27, at 576-77, 582-88.
113. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560-61.
114. Greene, supra note 25, at 2040 n.224.
115. See supra part III.C.
116. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
117. This argument is consistent with Johnson's argument, supra note 20, at 257-58,
that regardless of its effects on police behavior, courts should not countenance of-
ficers' explicit reliance on race as a basis for decisions to stop or arrest. Her point is
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argument for the conclusion that the law is distinctively powerless
against racist abuses. Only a critical analysis of that argument will
allow us rationally to evaluate the assumption that so long as par-
ticular racial groups are not explicitly targeted by guidelines for the
enhanced use of stops and frisks, racial impact is irrelevant to the
legality of those guidelines. That assumption is both a legacy of
Terry and a crucial underpinning of Wilson's and Sherman's recent,
influential proposals for enhanced use of stops and frisks.118 More-
over, the assumption is related to a more fundamental view that
permeates those proposals: namely, that concerns about racial jus-
tice are properly divorced from a commitment to fighting crime.
IV. A Critique of Terry's Argument that the Law Is Powerless
Against Racism
Terry derives its conclusion that heightened standards can do
nothing to curb racist abuses of the stop and frisk power from a
further, equivocal position pertaining to the exclusionary rule.
One of the most distinctive features of this nation's legal system is
the exclusionary rule, which holds that evidence obtained through
violations of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution. In other words, such evidence cannot be used to ob-
tain a conviction. In 1914 in Weeks v. United States,119 the Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule was binding on federal courts.
In 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado,2 0 however, the Supreme Court held
that the exclusionary rule was not binding on state courts, where
the overwhelming majority of criminal trials, and especially trials
of street crimes, were then held.' 2' One of the key starting points
that an independent discriminatory harm, apart from any racial injustice perpetrated
by officers, occurs when courts countenance officers' use of racial classifications.
Namely, courts are announcing to the public that racial discrimination is acceptable.
This Article, by contrast, is concerned solely with racially neutral standards for the
stop and frisk power, or, in other words, with standards that do not refer to race.
Since, as a matter of definition, courts do not expressly approve of reliance on race
when they promulgate such standards, the independent harm that Johnson sees in
judicial endorsement of the use of race is not present in the promulgation of racially
neutral standards. Concerns about racial justice are accordingly relevant to the choice
of a racially neutral standard only insofar as the choice affects the extent to which
considerations of race, rather than objectively suspicious behavior, motivate officers'
decisions to stop and frisk. To show, then, that the legal definition of racially neutral
standards for stops and frisks should not be divorced from considerations of racial
justice, it is necessary to show, as against Terry, that the law can reduce racist abuse.
118. See supra part I.
119. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
120. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
121. d.
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of the Warren Court's revolutionary expansion of the rights of
criminal defendants was Mapp v. Ohio.2 2 In Mapp, the Warren
Court explicitly overruled Wolf, holding that the exclusionary rule
was binding on state, as well as federal, courts. 123
As a consequence of the extension of the exclusionary rule, any
delineation of the scope of government power under the Fourth
Amendment is at the same time a delineation of the scope of the
evidence that can be used to obtain convictions. Thus, as the ma-
jority recognized in Terry, the issue in that case was not merely the
"abstract propriety" of a police officer's decision to stop and frisk
in the absence of probable cause.' 24 At stake was whether evi-
dence obtained as a result of a stop and frisk could be used to con-
vict an individual only if the stop and frisk was justified by
probable cause, or also if a more lenient, reasonable suspicion stan-
dard was met.12 5 In accord with the basic reasoning of Mapp v.
Ohio, the opinion for the Terry majority states that the cost of ex-
cluding reliable evidence is justified if the exclusion deters future
Fourth Amendment violations. Moreover, the Terry opinion as-
serts that the application of the exclusionary rule does, in general,
have this deterrent effect. In the words of the opinion,
"[E]xperience has taught that [the exclusionary rule] is the only
effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context,
and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of words'.'1
2 6
Nevertheless, the Terry majority concluded that the rule is totally
ineffective against the particular type of Fourth Amendment viola-
tion that was the target of the N.A.A.C.P.'s proposal to limit the
extent of the stop and frisk power.12 7 Recall that the N.A.A.C.P.
had argued that in order to deter racist abuses of the stop and frisk
power, the probable cause standard should be uniformly applied to
all searches and seizures, including stops and frisks.'2 8 The Terry
majority's reply was that, despite its general power to deter Fourth
Amendment violations, the exclusionary rule could do nothing to
prevent officers from stopping and frisking individuals because of
their race, rather than because of evidence of criminal activity. The
opinion sweepingly proclaims that "[t]he wholesale harassment by
122. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
123. Id. at 659-60.
124. 392 U.S. at 12.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
127. Id. at 13-14.
128. See supra part II.B.
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certain elements of the police community of which minority
groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be
stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal
trial.' 1
29
This empirical contention about the exclusionary rule's ineffec-
tiveness against police racism is the sole basis for the court's con-
clusion that racist abuses cannot be curbed by legal restrictions on
the scope of the stop and frisk power. An evaluation of the con-
tention is therefore crucial to assessing the validity of a crucial as-
sumption that Terry bequeathed to Fourth Amendment law:
namely, that facts about racial impact have no bearing on the ex-
tent of the stop and frisk power.
Many scholars have failed to recognize that Terry argued explic-
itly for the irrelevance of facts about racial impact. 130 Others have
confused Terry's argument with an argument for the general inef-
fectiveness of the exclusionary rule. 13 ' By contrast, noted Fourth
Amendment scholar Wayne R. LaFave recognized that the Terry
majority contended that the exclusionary rule is distinctly power-
less against racist abuses of the stop and frisk power. 32 LaFave
correctly notes that this contention was the basis for the Terry ma-
jority's conclusion that, no matter how much we care about racial
justice, facts about racial impact provide no argument for a stricter
129. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 (footnote omitted).
130. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
131. MARK TUSHNET, THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 23-24 (1993), confuses Terry's argument for the exclusionary rule's distinc-
tive inability to deter racist abuses of the stop and frisk power with an argument that
the rule is powerless to deter all abusive stops and frisks. In addition to failing to
recognize that Terry explicitly considered whether facts about racial impact were rele-
vant to delineating the legal standard for stops and frisks, Johnson, supra note 20,
assumes that the underlying empirical issue is the exclusionary rule's general effec-
tiveness, rather than its distinctive effectiveness against racial abuse. Thus, Johnson
states, "[w]hether judicial pronouncements that race is irrelevant to suspicion will de-
ter police officers from detaining persons on the basis of their race is more difficult.
This is a tiny part of the larger argument about the exclusionary rule: Does the sanc-
tion of exclusion effectively inhibit police illegality or does it merely set free some
factually guilty defendants?" Id. at 257.
An opposing misconception is implicit in Burkoff's reference, supra note 25, at 704,
to "[t]he exclusionary rule, relied on in Terry to constrain the exercise of investigatory
authority where there is no probable cause." This flies in the face of the fact that one
of Terry's principal arguments for allowing investigatory authority to be exercised on
less than probable cause was the exclusionary rule's presumed inability to constrain
racist abuse.
132. W.R. LAFAVE, "STREET ENCOUNTERS" AND THE CONSTITUTION: TERRY,
SIBRON, PETERS AND BEYOND, in POLICE PRACTICES AND THE LAW: ESSAYS FROM
THE MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 154-57 (F.A. Allen ed. 1982).
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standard for stops and frisks. 3 3 Mistakenly, however, LaFave con-
cludes that this contention is based on a recognition of "the hard
realities."'1 34
The opinion for the Terry majoritypurports to derive the conten-
tion from two premises. First, police officers sometimes initiate en-
counters with citizens for purposes that "are wholly unrelated to a
desire to prosecute for crime.' 35 Second, the exclusionary rule "is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are will-
ing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some
other goal.'1 36 Each of these premises is plausible enough. By
themselves, however, the two premises do not establish Terry's em-
pirical contention that the exclusionary rule is totally powerless
against racist abuses. This contention follows only on the further,
hidden premise that police officers' prosecutorial goals can virtu-
ally never override their racist motivations.
This hidden premise is true only if at least one of the following
three conditions obtains: (i) virtually no racially motivated stop
and frisk can ever uncover potentially incriminating evidence; or
(ii) virtually no individual police officer can ever be both racially
biassed and committed to prosecutorial goals; or (iii) the exclusion
of evidence obtained from racially motivated stops and frisks can
virtually never motivate police to curb their racist impulses, no
matter how important the evidence is.
Research on police behavior, as well as common sense, shows
that none of these conditions obtains in real life. The fact that ra-
cial prejudice motivated a stop and frisk does not preclude that
stop and frisk from leading to evidence of criminal activity. 137 Nor
need even extreme racial prejudice prevent an officer from also
being motivated to obtain convictions and/or to avoid having evi-
dence thrown out of court, if only for the purpose of avoiding dis-
approval or its consequences from prosecutors, judges or police
administrators. 138 Nor is it impossible for even the most conscien-
133. Id.
134. Id. at 154. For a vaguer grasp of Chief Justice Warren's argument, see Wil-
liams, supra note 27, at 575 & 575 n.35. For criticism of Williams's assessment of the
argument, see infra note 180.
135. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 14.
137. More generally, Black and Reiss recognize that even if police lack adequate
legal justification for engaging in a search, the search may nonetheless result in the
discovery of incriminating evidence. BLACK & REISS, supra note 35, at 86.
138. There is widespread scholarly agreement that interests in career advancement
can-and do-significantly curb officers' tendencies to act on racial prejudice in deal-
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tious officer to be motivated, perhaps unconsciously, to use racial
stereotypes as a basis for deciding whom to stop and frisk. 139
Terry's conclusion that the exclusionary rule is totally ineffica-
cious against racism thus follows only if we accept an unrealistic
and overly simple model of police motivation. Studies of the ef-
fects of police department policies on the exercise of deadly force
additionally argue against Terry's conclusion. Ironically, one of
these studies is* by Sherman, in collaboration with Ellen G.
Cohn. 140 The other is by Samuel Walker., one of this country's fore-
most historians of criminal justice. 14 1  Both studies note that
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, most police departments in
this country left the exercise of deadly force virtually unregu-
ing with citizens. See, e.g., William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations between
Federal and Local Police in MICHAEL TONRY AND NORVAL MORRIS (EDS.), MODERN
POLICING 231, 264 (Vol. 15 of MICHAEL TONRY (ed.), CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW
OF RESEARCH) (1992) ("[I]n most communities [with rising racial tensions], the po-
lice, albeit with occasional headline-producing exceptions and with ample room for
improvement in low-visibility conduct, display less institutionalized racism in their
dealings with others ... than is displayed by the average citizen. If such performance
is inspired as much by the career risks associated with misconduct as by personal
decency, so be it."); Sherman, Causes of Police Behavior: The Current State of Quanti-
tative Research,,17 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 69,76 (1980) [hereinafter Causes of Po-
lice Behavior] (racially prejudiced attitudes on the part of police are only weakly
related to racially prejudiced behavior); BLACK & REISS, supra note 35, at 138 ("[T]he
proportion of white police officers who reveal anti-Negro attitudes is quite strik-
ing... " However, "[a] recurring theme in the observers' reports was the great dispar-
ity between the verbalized attitudes of officers, in the privacy of the patrol car, and
the public conduct of officers in encounters with Negroes and members of other mi-
nority groups. There is a general paucity of evidence of discriminatory of[sic]
prejudiced behavior on the part of p6lice'6fficers in face-to-face encounters with Ne-
groes .... One might say that policemen, like other social actors, often are not quite
so free to act out their feelings as they appear to be."); SKOLNICK, supra note 28, at 83
("Whatever his personal preferences [including negative attitudes towards Blacks],
and, indeed, their influence upon his work, the policeman sees himself as a man who
extends justice. evenhandedly, a factor which in itself exerts some control over his
behavior.").
139. For the claim that officers tend to equate being a black male with being dan-
gerous, see, e.g., WALKER, infra note 148 and accompanying text; Bogomolny, infra
notes 204, 205 and accompanying text; Piliavin & Briar, infra notes 211, 212, and ac-
companying text; SKOLNICK, supra note 28, at 217-18 (citations omitted) ("One of the
unanticipated consequences of the policeman's standard of 'reasonableness' is that it
adversely affects many honest citizens living in high-crime areas. To a degree, all
persons residing in such areas are 'symbolic assailants'. A 'symbolic assailant'...
need not in fact be a criminal, but needs merely to conform to the stereotype. By this
standard, Negroes who live in black ghettoes are especially prone to being searched
according to.a 'reasonableness of the search' standard."); N.A.A.C.P. Brief, reprinted
in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 20, at 620-21; Maclin, supra note 27, at 259-60.
140. L.W. SHERMAN & E.G. COHN WITH P.R. GARTIN, E.E. HAMILTON & D.P.
ROGAN, CITIZENS KILLED By BIG CITY POLICE 1970-84 (1986).
141. S. WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM 25-33 (1993).
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lated.142 Basically, it was up to the individual officer to decide
when to shoot to kill. The absence of regulation was paralleled by
a lack of training or discipline. Police departments tended to pro-
vide extensive training in marksmanship but absolutely no instruc-
tion on when shooting was or was not justified. Even when police
shootings resulted in civilian deaths, the usual police department
response was a pro forma criminal investigation ending in a finding
of justifiable homicide. 143 Both Sherman and Cohn and Walker
stress that under this unrestrictive regime, police shot and killed
many more blacks than whites. In particular, Sherman and Cohn
cite Mendez's unpublished 1983 finding that in 1971, police in fifty-
seven of the cities with populations of over 250,000 shot and killed
seven times as many blacks as whites. 144 According to Walker, the
racial disparity throughout the country was as high as eight to one,
"len[ding] support to the allegation that the police had two trigger
fingers, one for whites and another for blacks.' 1 45 Walker empha-
sizes, moreover, that the racial disparity was very much higher
among persons shot and killed who were neither armed nor in the
process of assaulting a police officer. 146
Both studies contrast the unrestrictive regime of the 1960s and
early 1970s with the severe limits that police departments began to
set on officers' discretion during the 1970s and early 1980s. De-
partments themselves promulgated strict, racially neutral stan-
dards, basically decreeing that deadly force could be exercised only
in defense of the life of the officer or another person. Both Walker
and Sherman and Cohn stress that these strict standards were en-
forced through departmental disciplinary review of all shootings.
4 7
Moreover, Sherman and Cohn emphasize that tightened depart-
mental standards and disciplinary procedures were accompanied
by departments' institution of elaborate training in the appropriate
use of deadly force.' 48
The institution of such restrictive policies in the large police de-
partments in this country was accompanied by enormous reduc-
tions in both the numbers of civilians killed by police and the racial
142. hi At 148; SHERMAN & CoHmN supra note 147.
143. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 13; WALKER, supra note 141, at 26.
144. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 7.
145. WALKER, supra note 141, at 26-27.
146. Id. at 32.
147. WALKER, supra note 141, at 27-30; SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 13.
148. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 13.
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disparity among victims of deadly force.149 Sherman and Cohn
state that their own survey showed that in fifty of the fifty-nine
cities with populations of over 250,000, the numbers of civilians
shot and killed by police declined 51% from 1971 to 1984, from a
high of 353 in 1971 to a low of 172 in 1984.150 Using Sherman and
Cohn's data, Walker more modestly estimates that the decline in
the number of people shot and killed by police in these fifty large
cities was about "30 per cent between 1970 and 1984, from an aver-
age of about 300 a year to about 200."151 Both Walker and Sher-
man and Cohn argue that this reduction was driven by an over fifty
per cent reduction in the ratio of blacks to whites shot and killed by
police.152 Walker simply states that the disparity was "cut... from
roughly six blacks for every white to three to one.' 1 53 More pre-
cisely, Sherman and Cohn cite Mendez's finding that in fifty-seven
of the cities with populations of over 250,000, the ratio of blacks to
whites shot and killed by police fell from 7:1 in 1971 to 2.5:1 in 1978
and 2.8:1 in 1979. The reason for this decline in racial disparity was
that throughout the 1970s, the rate of whites shot and killed by
police per 100,000 whites in those cities was virtually constant. By
contrast, the rate of black citizens killed per 100,000 blacks in those
cities dropped fifty percent, from 2.8 in 1971 to 1.0 in 1978 and 1.4
in 1979.154
Sherman and Cohn and Walker agree that the changed police
department policies were the major, if not sole, cause of both the
overall reduction in police exercise of deadly force and the reduc-
tion in the racial disparity among victims. 155 In addition, Walker
advances a specific explanation of the fact that blacks dispropor-
tionately benefited from departments' promulgation and enforce-
ment of strict, racially neutral standards. According to Walker:
[I]t is possible to argue that an unrestrictive shooting policy al-
lows officers to act out their racial stereotypes: that the black
man lurking in the shadows is inherently dangerous, whereas the
149. By contrast, Walker, supra note 141, at 31, notes that "there was an ambiguous
pattern [in numbers of civilians killed by police] for the country as a whole. The
difference is probably due to the fact that restrictive shooting policies were more
prevalent among the largest cities."
150. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 2.
151. WALKER, supra note 141, at 31.
152. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 7; WALKER, supra note 141, at 26, 31.
153. WALKER, supra note 141, at 26, 31.
154. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 7. See also W.A. GELLER & M. ScoTr,
DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNOW 148 (1992).
155. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 9, 13-14; WALKER, supra note 141, at
25-26, 32-33.
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white suspect is not. Restrictive shooting policies, although
nominally addressed to race-neutral situations, curb the effect of
racial stereotypes, with rather dramatic results. 156
Ironically (and in contrast to the majority's rhetoric in Terry),157
both Sherman and Cohn and Walker note that as police exercise of
deadly force declined and became less racially imbalanced, there
was a substantial decline in the number of officers killed in the line
of duty. 158 . In particular, Sherman and Cohn state that the total
number of police killed in the line of duty (excluding automobile
accidents) in the fifty large cities they studied averaged 29 officers
per year from 1970 to 1975, but declined 48% to an average of 14
per year from 1976 to 1980. From 1981 to 1984, there was a slight
increase to an average of 17 per year.159 Walker similarly notes
that throughout the United States, the number of officers killed in
the line of duty declined from 131 in 1972 to 65 in 1990.160
Studies of the institutional operation of the exclusionary rule
demonstrate the relevance of the studies on deadly force to Terry's
empirical contention about the exclusionary rule's ineffectiveness
against racism. These studies show that it is a mistake to assume
that the exclusionary rule deters only, or even primarily, by appeal-
ing to the individual police officer's commitment to prosecutorial
goals. Rather, the exclusionary rule has worked by appealing to
prosecutors' and police administrators' interests in career advance-
ment and obtaining convictions. In turn, prosecutors and police
administrators have given individual officers institutional incen-
tives for conforming to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.' 61
156. WALKER, supra note 141, at 32.
157. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
158. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 2; WALKER, supra note 141, at 32.
.159. SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140, at 2.
160. WALKER, supra note 141, at 32.
161. In his dissent in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984), Justice Bren-
nan recognized that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule depends on the crea-
tion of institutional, rather than purely individual, incentives to conform to the Fourth
Amendment. Brennan wrote:
To be sure, the rule operates to some extent to deter future misconduct by
individual officers who have had evidence suppressed in their own cases.
But... the deterrence rationale for the rule is not designed to be, nor should
it be thought of as, a form of 'punishment' of individual police officers for
their failures to obey the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment. In-
stead, the chief deterrent function of the rule is its tendency to promote insti-
tutional compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements on the part of
law enforcement agencies generally.
468 U.S. at 953 (citations omitted).
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This process is strikingly illustrated by changes in the conduct of
New York City police officers. Before the Supreme Court's 1961
decision in Mapp v. Ohio,162 New York State courts did not exclude
evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. In turn, the New York City Police Depart-
ment provided its officers with absolutely no training in Fourth
Amendment requirements, 163 and New York City police officers
never- applied for search warrants. 164 District attorneys in New
Similarly, after his retirement from the United States Supreme Court, Justice Stew-
art wrote:
[T]he exclusionary rule is not designed to serve a 'specific deterrence' func-
tion; that is, it is not designed to punish the particular police officer for vio-
lating a person's fourth amendment rights. Instead, the rule is designed to
produce a 'systematic deterrence': the exclusionary rule is intended to create
an incentive for law enforcement officials to establish procedures by which
police officers are trained to comply with the fourth amendment because the
purpose of the criminal justice system-bringing criminals to justice-can be
achieved only when evidence of guilt may be used against defendants.
P. Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1400 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
162. 362 U.S. 643.
163. Former New York City Police Commissioner Michael Murphy wrote that as a
result of the Mapp decision, "[r]etraining sessions [in Fourth Amendment law] had to
be held [by the New York City Police Department for all officers] from the very top
administrators down to each of the thousands of foot patrolmen and detectives en-
gaged in the daily basic enforcement function. Hundreds of thousands of man-hours
had to be devoted to retraining 27,000 men." Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Meth-
ods in Law Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEX.
L. REV. 939, 941 (1966). According to Yale Kamisar, Commissioner Murphy's state-
ment implies that before Mapp, the New York City Police Department "spent no time
at all" in training police in Fourth Amendment requirements. The more general les-
son drawn by Kamisar is that police would not be trained in the Fourth Amendment
at all in the absence of the exclusionary rule. Kamisar, Remembering the Old World
of Criminal Procedure: A Reply To Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 537, 559
(1990). In his dissent in Leon, 468 U.S. at 954 n.13 (1984), Justice Brennan similarly
cites Commissioner Murphy's statement for the proposition that "the testimony of
those actually involved in law enforcement suggests that, at the very least, the Mapp
decision had the effect of increasing police awareness of Fourth Amendment require-
ments and of prompting prosecutors and police commanders to work towards educat-
ing rank-and-fie officers." Id.
164. At a training session in 1965 on Fourth Amendment law, New York City Dep-
uty Police Commissioner Reisman explained:
Before [Mapp required New York courts to exclude illegally seized evi-
dence] nobody bothered to take out search warrants. Although the U.S.
Constitution requires warrants in most cases, the U.S. Supreme Court had
ruled that evidence obtained without a warrant-illegally, if you will-was
admissible in state courts. So the feeling was, why bother?
Leon, 468 U.S. at 954 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Deputy Police Commis-
sioner Reisman's statement in support of the proposition that the exclusionary rule
deters primarily by creating institutional incentives for compliance with the Fourth
1996]
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York State were similarly unfamiliar with and uninterested in
Fourth Amendment requirements. 165 Once the Mapp decision was
issued, however, New York City police adminstrators responded to
the prospective loss of convictions and associated pressure from
prosecutors and judges by instituting training in the Fourth
Amendment.166 In response to this training and to the correlated
disciplinary incentives of not being subject to disapproval by police
adminstrators, prosecutors or judges and not being blocked in ca-
reer advancement, New York City police officers began applying
for search warrants.167
Amendment). According to Kamisar, this statement shows that police administrators
themselves recognized that until Mapp made illegally obtained evidence inadmissible
in New York State courts, individual officers had no incentive to obtain warrants.
Kamisar, supra note 163, at 556-57 & n.65.
For the related claim that before Mapp, New York City police officers did not feel
bound by Fourth Amendment requirements, see Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclu-
sionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REV. 24 (1980). Discussing the New
York City department, Loewenthal states that:
Prior to Mapp v. Ohio, the police were not aware that constitutional stan-
dards for search and seizure had been applied to them in Wolf v. Colorado;
no sanctions had been imposed in Wolf, and the police continued to search
with impunity. When the Mapp decision imposed the exclusionary rule on
the states, the police were confused because they had never been made
aware of the constitutional standards for searching. However, once the po-
lice realized what had happened, they assumed that the exclusionary rule
was an absolute necessity. Indeed, most police officers interpret the Wolf
case as not having imposed any legal obligation on the police since, under
that decision, the evidence would still be admissible no matter how it was
obtained. Thus, to police, the imposition of the exclusionary rule is a prereq-
uisite for the imposition of a legal obligation.
Id. at 29.
165. H. Richard Uviller, who was then in the New York District Attorney's office,
recalls the time of the Mapp decision:
Consternation was in plentiful supply. Our New York police obviously
would have to relearn a lot of basic procedure, both sides of the criminal bar
would have to read a passel of federal cases in a hurry, and our judges would
need to find phrases to sound knowledgeable and to make supportable dis-
criminations in a wholly unfamiliar area. I cranked out a crude summary of
federal search and seizure and suppression law just before the State District
Attorney's Association convened for its annual festival of anecdotes. I had
an instant runaway best seller. It was as though we had made a belated
discovery that the fourth amendment applied in the State of New York ....
Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some Constitutional
Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 VAND. L. REV. 501, 502 (1982). See also
Kamisar, supra note 163, at 557 n.65.
166. Kamisar, supra note 163 at 557.
167. See Loewenthal, supra note 164, at 35 n. 30 stating:
[W]here the police officer indicates to the prosecutor that the search took
place in a manner which is clearly illegal, the prosecutor may have the case
dismissed-or negotiate for a guilty plea to a much lesser charge-before
the pretrial hearing takes place. Thus, a police officer may avoid [the disci-
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Orfield's 1987 study of Chicago narcotics officers similarly ar-
gues that the exclusionary rule operates as a deterrent to Fourth
Amendment violations by motivating prosecutors and police ad-
ministrators to create institutional incentives for individual officers
to conform to the Fourth Amendment. 16  Orfield found that start-
ing in the 1960s and 1970s, the Illinois State's Attorney's office be-
gan to screen all warrant applications by Chicago police officers, to
provide training sessions for officers in problematic areas of Fourth
Amendment law, and to offer officers advice in ongoing investiga-
tions. 169 The Chicago Police Department also provided training for
recruits and "in-service" training in Fourth Amendment require-
ments.170  This training was complemented by a rating system
under which the police department transferred or demoted officers
or, more rarely, deprived them of promotions if courts suppressed
evidence in a number of their cases.171 Whenever evidence was
suppressed, the department required officers to file written reports
explaining why the evidence was suppressed and to offer explana-
tions to supervising officers in internal review sessions. 172
Orfield found that when backed by these institutional incentives,
the exclusionary rule significantly deterred Chicago narcotics of-
ficers from Fourth Amendment violations. 73 His study implies,
more specifically, that the exclusionary rule was particularly effec-
pline] of embarrassment [in open court] by "confessing" to the prosecutor.
However, police indicate that the prospect of such a confrontation with the
prosecutor is as distressing as having to expose their lack of professionalism
in court.
More generally, see Kamisar, supra note 163, at 556-57, 559-60, for a detailed dis-
cussion of how the Mapp decision motivated the New York City Police Department
and New York State prosecutors and judges to create institutional incentives for indi-
vidual police officers to conform to Fourth Amendment requirements.
A speech to Minnesota police officers by then-state attorney general Walter
Mondale in 1962 shows that Mapp also motivated prosecutors outside New York to
train police in Fourth Amendment law. According to Mondale:
[T]he very fact that these [post-Mapp search and seizure] institutes are
being held is eloquent testimony . . . of the basic wisdom of the Court's
decision. We are doing today, because of the Court's ruling, what we should
have done all along. We are studying ways in which we can bring our police
methods and procedures into harmony with the constitutional rights of the
people we serve.
Quoted in Kamisar, supra note 169, at 558 n.67.
168. M.W. Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of
Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987).
169. Id. at 1026-27.
170. Id. at 1028.
171. Id. at 1027-28, 1046-49.
172. Id. at 1027-29, 1046-47.
173. Orfield, supra note 168, at 1017-18, 1054-55.
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tive in deterring warrantless searches, including stops and frisks.
On the basis of extensive interviews with the narcotics officers,
Orfield concluded that "the exclusionary rule has caused the of-
ficers (1) to be especially careful in the context of warrantless
searches and (2) to use warrants when at all possible .... "'7 In
response to Orfield's questionnaire, the officers stated that the ex-
clusionary rule was particularly likely to prevent them from per-
forming "searches based on instinct.' '1 75
The process by which the exclusionary rule has been found to
deter Fourth Amendment violations is similar to the process by
which strict police department standards have been found to deter
police exercise of deadly force. 76 In both cases, individual officers
are deterred from violations because police departments provide
extensive training in the relevant legal standards, backed by ac-
countability mechanisms and sanctions for violations. In the case
of the exclusionary rule, prosecutors tend to provide officers with
additional training and to threaten them with additional sanc-
tions.1 77 We saw above that both Walker and Sherman and Cohn
found that blacks disproportionately benefited from departments'
promulgation and enforcement of strict, racially neutral standards
for police exercise of deadly force. This arguably occurred because
.the severe limits that departments set and enforced on discretion
discouraged officers from acting on an unthinking and stereotypical
equation of being black with being dangerous. Both Orfield's
study and the many studies of the changes that Mapp effected in
New York City Police Department practices argue that if courts
consistently enforced heightened Fourth Amendment standards
through the exclusion of evidence, prosecutors and police depart-
ments would respond by training officers in the heightened stan-
dards and sanctioning them for violations. Orfield's study argues,
more particularly, that this process would be as, if not more, likely
to occur and deter individual officers from violations if the height-
ened standards pertained to stops and frisks than if they pertained
to searches for which warrants were required. By finding that of-
ficers believed that the exclusionary rule was especially likely to
discourage them from "searches based on instinct,' 78 Orfield's
study additionally implies that strict, racially neutral limits on stops
174. Id. at 1040. See also id. at 1017-18, 1038, 1043.
175. Id. at 1053.
176. See SHERMAN & COHN, supra note 140; see also WALKER, supra note 141.
177. See Orfield supra notes 168-75.
178. Id.
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and frisks, enforced by judicial exclusion of evidence and corre-
lated prosecutorial and police department training and discipline,
can discourage officers from stopping and frisking individuals on
the basis of racial or other stereotypes.
In sum, studies of the institutional operation of the exclusionary
rule and of the racial impact of deadly force policies join with the
empirical research discussed above on the relations between of-
ficers' prosecutorial goals and racist motivations 179 to argue,
against the Terry majority opinion,.that the exclusionary rule can
deter racist abuse of the stop and frisk power.18 0 It follows that
there is no basis for Terry's conclusion that heightened standards
for the exercise of the stop and frisk power can at best amount to a
"futile protest" against racism.18 ' In other words, the Warren
Court's world-weary realism in arguing against the N.A.A.C.P.
Legal Defense and Education Fund's position in Terry was, in fact,
highly unrealistic. 82
179. See supra notes 140-156 and surrounding text.
180. The foregoing analysis of how the exclusionary rule deters argues against Wil-
liams' criticism of Warren's conclusion that heightened legal standards are powerless
to deter racist stops and frisks. On the one hand, Williams contends that Earl Warren
was right to claim that the exclusionary rule is. powerless to deter racist abuses. On
the other hand, Williams criticizes Warren for failing to recognize that "the Court
could have taken any number of positions to limit the exercise of discretion in those
situations, such as requiring police departments to develop enforceable guidelines for
the officers to follow in making stops on the street .... " Williams, supra note 27, at
575 n.35. In making these distinctions, Williams misses the point that the exclusionary
rule is capable of deterring racist stops and frisks precisely because it is capable of
motivating departments to promulgate and enforce strict, racially neutral standards.
For further discussion, see supra note 176 and accompanying text.
For implicit agreement with the view that the exclusionary rule can deter racist
abuses, see Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dia-
logue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23 (1962)
(citations omitted)("One of the primary reasons the Court finally imposed the exclu-
sionary rule on the states was the realization that 'other remedies have been worthless
and futile.' But this, in turn, was largely true because those who felt the brunt of
police lawlessness were the vagrants, the migratories, the 'youthful imitation gang-
sters,' the slum dwellers, poverty-ridden Negroes, Mexicans, and other minority
groups.").
181. In a review of the literature in 1992, Sherman similarly concluded that strict,
racially neutral guidelines can restrict racist abuse of the stop and frisk power. See
Lawrence W. Sherman, Attacking Crime: Police & Crime Control, in 15 MODERN PO-
LICING 159, 173, 189 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) [hereinafter Attack-
ing Crime]. For a discussion of Sherman's 1992 conclusions, see infra note 223 and
accompanying text.
182. Claims about the impossibility of effecting proposed reforms often turn out to
be similarly unrealistic and, hence, ideological. See, e.g., HARRY BRAVERMAN,
LABOR & MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1974) (discrediting the supposedly realistic conten-
tion that in an industrial society, work must necessarily be routinized); Adina
Schwartz, Meaningful Work, 92 ETHics 634, 639-42 (1982) (discussing implications of
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V. Contemporary Implications of the Critique
This critical assessment is relevant because our situation in 1995
is very similar to the situation depicted in Terry in 1968. There
exists a seething resentment of police practices-including stops
and frisks-in minority communities. 183 Blacks are more likely to
be stopped and frisked than whites. 184 The studies of deadly force
policies, 85 together with direct evidence of both racial animus on
the part of police officers186 and a tendency to equate being black
with being dangerous, 87 argue that the racial disparity cannot sim-
ply be attributed to greater black criminality and consequent good
police work consisting of stopping and frisking those in fact most
likely to be involved in crime.' 88
Braverman's work for the possibility of reforming the workplace to foster individual
autonomy); Peter Applebome, Keeping Tabs on Jim Crow: John Hope Franklin, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 34 (noted historian of African-Americans
states in interview that, "Because we made mistakes at the first stab at... desegrega-
tion... doesn't mean we shouldn't keep trying to do it.... ."); What to Do about
Crime, supra note 2, at 28 (James Q. Wilson opines that "[a]s for rehabilitating juve-
nile offenders, it has some merit, but there are rather few success stories," and thereby
fallaciously implies that past failures show that future attempts at rehabilitation must
necessarily fail).
183. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 27, at 243-45, 256-58, 261; MANN, supra note 21, at
139-40, 149, 163-64; Williams, supra note 28, at 584-88; SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note
33, at 15; see also Causes of Police Behavior, supra note 145, at 77 ("Proactive en-
counters.., appear to differ substantially from reactive encounters. Citizens are gen-
erally more antagonistic to the police in proactive encounters and police are
correspondingly harsher in their manner, but only toward suspects.").
184. See, e.g., MANN, supra note 20, at 149-51; Powell & Hershenov, supra note 33,
at 613; Browning, Cullen, Cao, Kopache and Stevenson, Race and Getting Hassled by
the Police: A Research Note, 17 POLICE STUDIES 1 (1994); Smith, Race, Crime, and
Criminal Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 1065-70 (Mike
Maguire, Rodney Morgan & Robert Reiner eds., 1994) (discussing studies showing
British police are more likely to stop blacks than whites).
185. See supra notes 140-154 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., SKOLNICK, supra note 20, at 80-82 ("When one observes police in the
routine performance of their duties, one hears all the usual derisive terms referring to
Blacks and a few others besides .... A negative attitude toward Blacks was a norm
among the police studied, as recognized by the chief himself.... [Hiostile feelings
toward the Black are characteristic of white policemen in general."); Maclin, supra
note 27, at 271; MANN, supra note 20, at 146-47.
As indicated at note 138 supra, studies have found that racially prejudiced attitudes
on the part of police are only weakly related to racially prejudiced behavior. How-
ever, this fails to establish that racially prejudiced attitudes have absolutely no impact
on police behavior. For an argument that racially prejudiced attitudes do have a be-
havioral impact, see MANN, supra note 20, at 142-43.
187. See Greene supra note 27, at 2053 n.264 ("Where there is racial stereotyping,
people tend to enforce the law more harshly against those groups perceived to be
more violent or criminal."). See also supra note 139.
188. Further, anecdotal evidence that racial bias contributes to the racial disparity
is provided by many accounts of black men-including prominent citizens-being
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We do not, however, have any precise idea of the extent to which
the racially disparate incidence of stops and frisks reflects police
bias against blacks or greater black criminality and corresponding
police expertise in apprehending those most likely to be involved
in crime. This gap in our knowledge would not impede the proper
legal delimitation of the stop and frisk power if the Terry majority
was right to conclude that heightened standards can do nothing to
deter racist abuses. However, this Article has demonstrated that
Terry's argument for that conclusion is fatally flawed. 189 Thus, we
cannot comfort ourselves by concluding, as the Warren Court did,
that no matter how much we care about racial justice, our concern
is irrelevant to delineating the proper legal standard for stops and
frisks.
To the contrary, the foregoing critique of Terry's argument shows
that there are strong grounds to believe that strict, racially neu-
trally guidelines can deter officers from intruding on citizens simply
because they are black. Moreover, there is no conflict between the
view that Fourth Amendment law should be changed to take ac-
count of racial impact and the view that internal police department
rulemaking is a more sensitive and effective vehicle for regulating
stops and frisks than the law itself.19 As studies on the exclusion-
ary rule show, legal regulation has been a necessary and major im-
petus for internal rulemaking and correlated discipline and training
by police departments.1 91 In particular, police enthusiasm about
stopped by police even though they were innocent of all crime. See, e.g., M. TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 50-51 (1995); Wil-
liams, supra note 27, at 566-70; Greene, supra note 27, at 2022-23, 2039-40; Macin,
supra note 27, at 250-56; Kenneth B. Noble, A Showman in the Courtroom, for Whom
Race Is a Defining Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at A27 (discussing incident in
which police with drawn guns stopped and searched Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., a black
man who was then the third highest official in the Los Angeles District Attorney's
office and went on to become O.J. Simpson's lead defense lawyer).
189. See supra Part IV.
190. See Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 417-31, for the classic statement of the view
that police rulemaking is a more effective instrument than the law for regulating war-
rantless searches, including stops and frisks.
191. According to Anthony Amsterdam, "The sanction [of the exclusionary rule]
would also probably provide the only available incentive to the police to make the
[internal police department] rules [regulating warrantless searches], make them clear
and make them a part of recruit and in-service training." Supra note 46, at 429. See
also id. at 431.
. Samuel Walker similarly argues that changes in judicial interpretations of the Con-
stitution and in internal police department rules have been intertwined:
[Tihe various [Constitutional, state and federal law, and departmental
rulemaking] sources of rules interact with one another in a complex manner,
with changes in one area stimulating or forcing changes in other areas. The
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Sherman's Gun Experiments' 92 argues that a heightened legal stan-
dard-enforced through the exclusion of evidence-would be nec-
essary to stimulate departments to make and enforce effective
guidelines against racially motivated stops and frisks. Thus, this
Article's critical consideration of Terry's argument implies that ra-
cial impact, as well as individual and government interests, should
be taken into account in both the legal and administrative delimita-
tion of the stop and frisk power.
This conclusion is not tantamount, however, to the advocacy of
any particular change in the extent of the stop and frisk power. To
the contrary, the paucity of empirical knowledge of the causes of
the racially disparate incidence of stops and frisks makes it impos-
sible to determine whether the disparate impact justifies any
change in the scope of the stop and frisk power. Much less does
the requisite empirical basis exist for deciding what types of height-
ened, racially neutral limits the law or police department guidelines
should impose. 193
The following distinctions show why substantive proposals for
changes in Fourth Amendment law or internal police department
guidelines must wait on empirical researchers' developing some
well-grounded estimate of the extent to which the racially disparate
incidence of stops and frisks is caused by police bias against blacks
or greater black criminality and corresponding police expertise in
apprehending those most likely to be involved in crime. Restric-
tions on the stop and frisk power are called for to the extent that
police racial bias is the cause of the racially disparate impact of
stops and frisks. To the extent, however, that the racial disparity
results from greater black criminality and correlated police exper-
tise in apprehending those most likely to be involved in crime, the
vice is not police practices, but rather the higher black crime rate.
The proper response to this vice is not restrictions on officers'
power to stop and frisk, but rather measures to decrease the racial
disparity in crime. Decriminalization is appropriate if, as has been
argued in regard to drug crimes, higher black crime rates reflect
impact of the [Supreme] Court's rulings in Mapp and Miranda, for example,
has been felt far beyond the precise holdings of those decisions. They stimu-
lated a broad reform movement within policing that encompasses improve-
ments in recruitment standards, training, and supervision-including
measures designed to control discretion.
Supra note 141, at 19.
192. See supra note 14.
193. See supra notes 140-154 and accompanying text for studies showing that ra-
cially neutral limits are especially effective against police racist abuse.
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the unwarranted attachment of criminal penalties to behavior in
which blacks are disproportionately involved. 194 Where, as in the
case of gun crimes, criminalization is clearly appropriate, an inci-
dence of stops and frisks that accurately mirrored higher black
criminality would call primarily for addressing the social and eco-
nomic causes of crime. Even if justified by higher black criminal-
ity, however, especially frequent stops and frisks of blacks could
create perceptions of discrimination, thereby fuelling tension be-
tween minority communities and police. While changes in police
practices might be called for by this situation, the changes would
not be the same as those called for if the racially disparate inci-
dence of stops and frisks was actually the product of police racial
bias. Instead of aiming directly to limit police discretion, the
changes would aim to correct community perceptions while not im-
peding officers from exercising their proven expertise in appre-
hending crime. Thus, the causes of the racially disparate incidence
of stops and frisks must be understood if courts, police depart-
ments, legislators and policy makers are properly to respond to
that disparity. 195
Surprisingly, the gap in our knowledge about the relative roles of
police racial bias and black criminality in the racially disparate inci-
dence of stops and frisks is not the result of scholarly controversy.
Instead, it is the result of an absence of scholarly attention. An
enormous scholarly literature considers whether and to what ex-
tent greater black involvement in crime or racial bias in the crimi-
nal justice system accounts for the facts that blacks are much more
likely than whites to be arrested, indicted, convicted and impris-
oned. 196 By contrast, there have been no recent scholarly attempts
194. TONRY, supra note 188, at 81-123; Powell & Hershenov, supra note 33, passim.
195. For arguments similar to those in the above paragraph, see Smith, supra note
184, at 1042-49 and passim, and TONRY, supra note 188, at 79-80. As indicated supra
notes 12-14 and surrounding text, one of the problems with Sherman's evaluation of
the Kansas City Gun Experiment is a failure to distinguish between community oppo-
sition to "justified" and "unjustified" stops and frisks.
196. "[Alt every criminal justice system stage from arrest through incarceration,
blacks are present in numbers greatly out of proportion to their presence in the gen-
eral population. In 1991, for example, blacks made up a bit under 13 percent of the
general population but 44.8 percent of those arrested for violent felonies and nearly
50 percent of those in prison on an average day." TONRY, supra note 188, at 49; see
also id. at 28-31, 56-62 and passim. For similar statistics, see, e.g., Norval Morris, Race
and Crime: What Evidence Is There that Race Influences Results in the Criminal Justice
System?, 72 JUDICATURE 111, 112 (1988); Greene, supra note 27, at 2036; Joseph F.
Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice Dis-
crimination, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2273, 2275-76 (1993). See also RONALD L. AKERS,
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES: INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION 26 (1994) ("Adoles-
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to compare the roles of racial bias and black criminality in officers'
decisions to stop, frisk, or otherwise subject blacks to actions which
may or may not lead to arrests or formal charges. 197
cent and young adult, lower-class and minority males are very much overrepresented
in arrests, prosecutions, convictions and imprisonments.")
Many scholars claim that greater black criminality is the principal explanation for
black overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Akers, supra, at 26-
29; WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1987);
Smith, supra note 184, at 1045. However, some of the scholars who accept this claim
argue that racism within the criminal justice system is nonetheless a significant factor
in black overrepresentation. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 188, at 49 ("[Flor nearly a
decade there has been a near consensus among scholars and policy analysts that most
of the black punishment disproportions result not from racial bias or discrimination
within the [criminal justice] system but from patterns of black offending and of blacks'
criminal records. Drug law enforcement is the conspicuous exception. Blacks are
arrested and confined in numbers grossly out of line with their use or sale of drugs.");
Morris, supra at 112 (although studies by Blumstein and Petersilia show that "about
eighty per cent of the black overrepresentation in prison can be explained by differen-
tial involvement in crime," the remaining twenty percent is the result of "racially dis-
criminatory processes" within the criminal justice system).
For disagreement with the view that black criminality is the principal cause of black
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system, see, e.g., Greene, supra note 27, at
2032-38; MANN, supra note 20, passim ; Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at
1507-09; Williams, supra note 27, at 583, 585-86.
197. Akers, supra note 196, at 27 n.4, states that:
This research [on the existence of racial bias within the criminal justice
system] almost exclusively examines formal decision points - arrest, indict-
ment, conviction and sentencing. It does not look closely at racial and neigh-
borhood disparities in informal and unauthorized action taken on the street.
It may be that racial and class biases are found in the patterns of police
patrols, citizen harassment, stop and search, stop and interrogate, use of ex-
cessive force, and other actions taken by the police in the community that do
not get recorded. It may also be that this ongoing pattern, and well-publi-
cized cases such as the infamous beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles
police, that [sic] continues to support the image of a criminal justice system
that is racially and class biassed.
TONRY, supra note 188, at 51, similarly recognizes that the absence of racial bias at
formal decision points in the criminal justice system does not settle the question of
whether racially-based suspicions underlie police officers' decisions short of arrest.
"[T]hat police and others too often for no reason other than skin color or style of
dress are suspicious of blacks does not, according to the best available evidence, mean
that blacks as defendants and convicted offenders are treated fundamentally differ-
ently than whites."
For works examining the relative roles of black criminality and racial bias in formal
criminal justice processes, but not in police-citizen encounters short of arrest, see, e.g.,
TONRY, supra note 188; WILBANKS, supra note 196.
Some scholars assume without argument that racial bias must be the principal, if
not sole, cause of the racially disparate incidence of all actions by police and criminal
justice system officials, including stops and frisks. This assumption is revealed in the
claim, advanced without any consideration of the relative yield of incriminating evi-
dence from stops of blacks and whites, that police racial bias, rather than greater
black criminality and police expertise in apprehending those involved in crime, neces-
sarily explains the especially frequent arrests of black motorists on New Jersey high-
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The most recent scholarly consideration of this issue in the
United States is Bogomolny's 1976 study of a major city in which
officers called police dispatchers whenever they stopped citizens
and desired record checks. 19 All calls were recorded, and
Bogomolny and his colleagues analyzed the records for ten consec-
utive days in 1973,199 during which time recorded stops were made
of 5,998 people, eighteen of whom were apprehended for prior of-
fenses and sixty of whom received traffic citations."° Bogomolny
found that the proportion of black males among the remaining
5,920 "innocent" individuals who were subjected to no further po-
lice action was greater than the proportion of black males among
those arrested in the jurisdiction during the preceding year.20 1 The
proportion of black males in the "innocent" population of stopped
individuals was also greater than their proportion in the population
available for stopping, as measured by analyzing a control popula-
tion of people randomly stopped at roadblocks set up in
socioeconomically varied neighborhoods.20 2  In addition,
Bogomolny found that there was "[n]o appreciable disparity" in
arrest and conviction rates between the "innocent" population of
the stopped individuals and the control, roadblock population.20 3
Thus, the greater proportion of blacks among the "innocent" popu-
lation of stopped individuals could not be attributed to a police
tendency to stop those involved in crime in the past.
Bogomolny concluded, on this basis, that the rates with which
blacks were stopped could not be explained by police expertise in
targeting those most likely to be involved in crime z.2 1 Instead, po-
lice racial bias-whether consisting of animus against blacks or a
cognitive overestimation of black dangerousness-was a major
cause of blacks being stopped more frequently than would be ex-
ways. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 27, at 2032-38; MANN, supra note 20, at 145;
Maclin, supra note 27, at 268, 277; C.J. JOHNS, POWER, IDEOLOGY, AND THE WAR ON
DRUGS 91 (1992); Powell & Hershenov, supra note 33, at 613.
198. Robert L. Bogomolny, Street Patrol: The Decision to Stop a Citizen, 12 CRIM.
L. BULL. 544, 567-73 (1976). For discussions of this study, see, e.g., Causes of Police
Behavior, supra note 138 at 79; and Burkoff, supra note 25, at 705-06.
199. Bogmolny, supra note 198, at 567 n.98, noted that there were "a number of
methodological problems" with the study, including "the fact that it is not possible to
say whether or not this ten-day sample is long enough to provide a fair representation
of police work."
200. Id. at 567.
201. Id. at 567-569, 571.
202. Id. at 568, 571-572.
203. Id. at 572-73.
204. Bogomolny, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. at 573.
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pected, given their availability for stopping. In Bogomolny's
words:
When stopping persons on the street, it appears that officers use
as a measure of criminality past contact with the police without
any clear sense of who is most likely to be criminally involved.
If this is true, it raises serious questions concerning the quality
of the 'police expertise' utilized in making the judgment to stop
a person on the street. Further, because of the disproportion-
ately high number of young black male persons stopped, serious
questions appear concerning the perceptions of the officer in
stopping a particular person. It is not clear that the officer is
prejudiced or acting from inappropriate motivation. He may
have an honest perception that the persons stopped represent a
criminal class of people. Yet the relatively poor yield, given the
number of persons stopped and the comparison with the control
group, raises doubt concerning the utility of this type of
behavior.2 °5
Bogomolny's findings appear inconsistent with Black and Reiss's
1967 findings, discussed above, on the relative rates with which
weapons were recovered from frisks of blacks and whites.20 6 His
findings are consistent, however, with 1964 findings by Piliavin and
Briar20 7 which, by contrast with the Black and Reiss findings, were
relied on in the Police Task Force Report to the President's Com-
mission.0 8 On the basis of nine months' observation of encounters
between police officers from a single department and seventy-six
juveniles, Piliavin and Briar reported that seven, or seventy per-
cent, of the ten juveniles exonerated and released without suspi-
cion were black.20 9 By contrast, less than one-third of the sixty-six
remaining allegedly "guilty" juveniles were black.210 Piliavin and
Briar concluded that black "youths were accosted more often than
others by officers on patrol simply because their skin color identi-
205. Id. at 573. Notwithstanding their negative assessment of police decisions to
stop, Bogomolny and his colleagues may have systematically underestimated the
amount of police racial bias by considering only stops in which record checks were
requested from dispatchers. It seems unlikely that officers effecting stops for the pur-
pose of racial harassment would ask for record checks, especially if they knew that
such requests would be recorded.
206. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
207. Irving Piliavin & Scott Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 Am. J. Soc.
206 (1964).
208. POLICE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 35, at 184. The Piliavin and Briar
study is cited by Sherman in Causes of Police Behavior, supra note 138, at 79.
209. Piliavin & Briar, supra note 207, at 212 n.22.
210. Id. at 212 n.22.
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fled them as potential trouble makers."21' They further observed
that police bias was illustrated by the following incident. "One of-
ficer, observing a youth walking along the street, commented that
the youth 'looks suspicious' and promptly stopped and questioned
him. Asked later to explain what aroused his suspicion, the officer
explained, 'He was a Negro wearing dark glasses at midnight.' "212
Other studies that purport to bear on the issue are of little aid in
assessing the extent to which the racially disparate impact of stops
and frisks is explained by police racial bias or police expertise in
apprehending those most likely to be involved in crime. A 1994
study by Browning, Cullen, Cao, Kopache and Stevenson is explic-
itly motivated by the recognition that "[t]o date, research ... has
examined primarily the overt discriminatory practices of the police:
arrest, police brutality, and the use of deadly force. In contrast,
there is less attention paid to those police efforts of surveillance or
social control in which no offense was committed, no arrest made,
and no violent exchange manifested. 2 13 The study, however, re-
ports differences in the frequencies with'which whites and blacks
perceive themselves and their personal acquaintances as being
"hassled" by police, or, in other words, "stopped or watched
closely ... even when [they] had done nothing wrong. "214 By con-
trast, to assess the relative roles of racial bias and black criminality
in decisions to stop or frisk, it is necessary to compare the frequen-
cies with which actual stops of blacks and whites yield or do not
yield incriminating evidence.
This assessment cannot be made if only stops that yield incrimi-
nating evidence are considered. Thus, Wilson and Boland's 1978
finding of no significant correlation between the proportion of non-
whites in a city's population and high rates of moving traffic viola-
211. Id. at 213.
212. Id. at 212 n.22.
213. Browning, Cullen, Cao, Kopache and Stevenson, Race and Getting Hassled by
the Police: A Research Note, 17 POLICE STUDIEs 3 (1994).
214. Id. at 4. The study found that "there is a significant association between being
African-American and experiences of being hassled by the police. As opposed to
only 9.6 percent of the whites, 46.6 percent of the blacks sampled reported being
'personally hassled by the police'.... [Riace explains approximately 18 percent of the
variation between whites and African-Americans in their experiences of being hassled
by the police.... Again, being an African-American significantly increased the likeli-
hood of hearing about an incidence of being hassled by the police .... As opposed to
12.5 percent of whites, 66.0 percent of blacks reported knowing someone who was
watched by the police when he or she had done nothing wrong. Race explains 31
percent of the variation in the vicariously hassled experiences by the police." Id. at 5-
6.
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tions2 15 says nothing as to the existence of racial differences in the
proportion of traffic stops that do not lead to ticketing. Similarly,
Boydstun's noted 1975 study of the San Diego Field Interrogation
Experiment analyzes only those field interrogations that
culminated either in an arrest or in a failure to remove the officer's
suspicions.216 Because field interrogations that resulted in the re-
moval of all suspicion were not considered, Boydstun's findings of
an absence of racial discrimination2 17 leave open the possibility
that field interrogations of blacks were especially likely to result in
the removal of all suspicion.21 8
In sum, by contrast to Black and Reiss's 1967 study,
Bogomolny's 1976 study and Piliavin and Briar's 1964 study both
argued that racial bias was a major cause of the racially disparate
incidence of stops and frisks. However, no subsequent United
States studies compare both the frequencies with which blacks and
whites are stopped and frisked and the frequencies with which
those stops and frisks yield incriminating evidence.219 In the ab-
215. James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW
& Soc'y REv. 367, 371, 379-80 (1978).
216. BOYDSTUN, SAN DIEGO FIELD INTERROGATION FINAL REPORT 3, 27, Figure
4-47 (1975). Boydstun acknowledged the significance of those unreported field inter-
rogations that resulted in the total removal of suspicion. "Some time is also spent on
contacts initiated by officer suspicion during which the officer's suspicions are allayed
and no record is made. The exact proportion of these is not known, though the ob-
servers developed the impression that such contacts occur as frequently as those that
lead to a report." Id. at 63.
217. Id. at 41, 48, 51.
218. In a 1980 study, Mark H. Moore argued explicitly, as I do here, that racial bias
may fail to be detected if one considers only arrests resulting from proactive patrols
against guns and does not also consider stops that fail to lead to arrests. According to
Moore:
[W]hile there is a tendency for proactive arrests to involve a more minority
and youthful population, a shift in arrest practices toward proactive methods
need not be accompanied by dramatic changes in the characteristics of those
arrested. Obviously, recorded arrests for weapons offenses need not reflect
the incidence of stops and searches, and we may be as concerned with the
stops as with the arrests.
Mark H. Moore, The Police and Weapons Offenses, 452 ANNALS 22, 32 (1980). This
concern notwithstanding, Moore's data included only stops that resulted in recorded
arrests.
219. Neither subject searches in the NCJRS (National Criminal Justice Reference
Service) database nor a search for citations of Bogomolny's work in the Social Science
Citation Index uncovered any such studies in the United States. These results are
consistent with Akers's claim, discussed supra note 196, that there has been extensive
attention to the role of racial bias in formal criminal justice system decisions, but
almost no consideration of whether and to what extent racial bias infects informal
police-citizen encounters. The failure to uncover recent work is also consistent with
the fact that, in a review of the literature in 1992, Lawrence Sherman concluded that
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sence of these studies, there are nonetheless, as argued above,
strong grounds to believe that racial bias continues to contribute to
the racially disparate incidence of stops and frisks.220 We cannot,
however, intelligently assess how important a factor racial bias is
today.
This gap in our knowledge is rendered especially urgent by
James Q. Wilson's recent advocacy of increased use of stops and
frisks and by the expected emulation of Lawrence Sherman's Kan-
sas City and Indianapolis Gun Experiments throughout this coun-
try.221 As recently as 1992, Sherman explicitly claimed that
proactive police strategies, including stops and frisks, are especially
subject to racist abuse.222 He also argued that racist abuse could be
curbed through racially neutral limits on the exercise of police
22powers. 23 Consistently with these claims, Sherman could have
stops and frisks and other proactive police strategies create a significant danger of
racist abuse, but did not rely on any recent empirical work for that conclusion. Sher-
man's only citations were to the facts in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) and
to P. Rossi, R.E. Berk, and B.K. EIDSON, THE ROOTS OF URBAN DISCON'rENT: PUB-
LIC POLICY, MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE GHETrO (1974). See Attacking
Crime, supra note 167, at 173, 188-89. See also supra notes 197, 213 and accompany-
ing text.
Bogomolny's and Piliavin and Briar's conclusions appear inconsistent with D.J.
Smith's findings from a 1981 survey of people in metropolitan London. See, POLICE
AND PEOPLE IN LONDON, supra note 20. There, Smith defined a stop as "produc[ing]
a result" if it led to the reporting of an offense, whether or not the stoppee was subse-
quently arrested or charged. Id. at 116. He concluded that "the tendency for the
police to stop a higher proportion of West Indians than of white people is justified in
the sense that an equal proportion of stops of the two groups produces a 'result'." Id.
Interestingly, however, the fact that only about one in twelve stops of Londoners
led to a "result" led Smith to qualify the conclusion that the racial disparity in the
incidence of stops was justified by the "results". According to Smith:
[Tihis is a justification only in a narrow sense. The great majority both of
white people and of West Indians who are stopped are not shown to have
committed an offence, and the findings from observational work ... show
that police are exceeding their formal powers in making many of those stops.
Further, .. . experience of being stopped-especially of being stopped re-
peatedly-tends strongly to make people hostile to the police. The rela-
tively high rate of stops of West Indians is understandable in the light of the
"results" produced, but it does not follow that the policy is wise or, in a
broad sense, productive when all the consequences are taken into account.
Id. See also, Smith, supra note 184, at 1067-68.
220. See supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part I.
222. See Attacking Crime, supra note 181, at 173, 189.
223. Sherman stated that the fact, revealed in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352
(1983), "that the San Diego Police had collectively and discriminatorily harassed a
black man with a 'dreadlock' hair style who liked to walk around town suggests the
potential difficulty with any proactive policy aimed at 'suspicious' persons as targets.
But this is ... a problem that might be solved with more specific guidelines, especially
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been expected to investigate the relative roles of racial bias and
greater black criminality in officers' decisions to stop and frisk dur-
ing his gun experiments. He could also have been expected to con-
sider how guidelines might be designed to curb any bias observed.
Sherman did not pursue these inquiries, however.
Sherman appears to believe that his failure to pursue this re-
search is justified by the fact that black communities have so far
welcomed, rather than opposed, his gun experiments.224 If, how-
ever, the gun experiments provide an avenue for racially discrimi-
natory police action, this counts as a cost, even in the absence of
community disapproval. Moreover, as Boydstun cautioned in his
noted study of the San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment, the
fact that community antagonism is not incited by a given level of
stops and frisks does not preclude its being incited by escalated
use.
225
Moreover, Sherman appears to believe that it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to measure the extent to which police racial bias
or greater black criminality is the cause of the racially disparate
incidence of stops and frisks.226 This measuring difficulty was sig-
nificantly circumvented, however, by Sherman's own selection of
targets for intensive stops in Indianapolis this past year. On the
basis of the racially neutral criterion of amount of gun crime per
square mile, three areas-one with a predominantly white popula-
tion and two with predominantly black populations-were
if they are race-neutral in design and effect." Id. at 189. He similarly claimed that
"[p]roactive policing.., has... the ... disadvantage of potentially systematic discrim-
ination against certain ethnic or political groups .... Yet unlike reactive policing,
proactive policing has great potential for controlling such selection bias. Using objec-,
tive criteria for target selection, proactive strategy can come closer to egalitarian po-
licing, giving all similarly situated individuals equal odds of being selected as targets."
Id. at 173.
224. See Butterfield, supra note 4. Sherman's collaborator, J. Wilford Shaw, makes
a related attempt to justify lack of concern with racial impact. For discussion and
criticism of Shaw's attempted justification, see supra note 13.
225. Boydstun cautioned that "Although there was little evidence that FI [field in-
terrogation] activities influenced police-community relations in San Diego, there were
some indications that the community might consider any increase in the currently low
level of FT activity as an inappropriate use of patrol time. Pending further investiga-
tion, the current levels of activity should not be increased.... ." Boydstun, supra note
216, at 6, 64. Downplaying this caution, Sherman stated, in his 1992 review of the
literature, that "[w]ith proper training and supervision in a community relations-con-
scious police culture, field interrogations need not provoke community hostility, as
the San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment suggests." Attacking Crime, supra note
181, at 188 (citation omitted).
226. See Sherman Comments, supra note 5.
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targeted for intensive stops in Indianapolis.227 Granted that the ra-
cially neutral criterion of amount of gun crime per square mile was
used to select the areas and that, as Sherman assumed, the race of
people stopped in each area would largely depend on the racial
composition of each area's population,228 it was still possible that
race would influence officers' decisions to stop or not stop particu-
lar people in each Indianapolis target area. More precisely,
Bogomolny's and other studies suggest that independently of be-
havioral indications of criminality, the race of those driving
through each area and thus available for stopping would affect of-
ficers' general readiness to stop and/or frisk during the Indianapo-
lis experiment, the types of circumstances that officers perceived as
indicative of a need to stop and/or frisk, and/or the relative intru-
siveness of the stops and/or frisks effected (e.g., numbers of officers
involved, whether officers drew or pointed guns, whether suspects
were ordered to leave their cars, whether they were frisked and
whether the frisk extended to intimate body parts). 229 The case law
and empirical studies similarly suggest that independently of be-
havioral indications of criminality, decisions to stop and/or frisk
and/or the relative intrusiveness of stops and frisks would be af-
fected by whether people driving through each of the Indianapolis
target areas were racially out of place (i.e., whether whites were in
the predominantly black target areas or blacks were in the
predominantly white target area). 230
These hypotheses could have been tested if records had been
made of all stops effected during the Indianapolis experiment and
if the records had included the race (as perceived by the involved
officer(s)) of the person(s) stopped and the target area in which the
stop was made. The records would also have needed to indicate
the yield of each stop, or, in other words, whether the stop resulted
in the recovery of guns, other incriminating evidence (possibly bro-
ken down into knives, drugs and a residual category) or no incrimi-
nating evidence. If these records had been kept, the yields from
stops of blacks in the black target areas could have been compared
with those from stops of whites in the white target area. Compari-
sons could also have been made between the yields from stops, in
both the black and white target areas, of racially out of place and
racially in place people. If, among officers involved in the Indian-
227. See supra note 16.
228. See Sherman Comments, supra note 5.
229. See supra note 19.
230. See references and discussion supra note 20.
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apolis experiment, there was either significant animus against
blacks or a significant tendency to overestimate the dangerousness
of black males, the yield of guns and, possibly, other incriminating
evidence could have been expected to be lower per stop of a black
in a black target area than per stop of a white in the white target
area. If there was similar animus or unjustified suspicion of either
blacks or whites who were racially out of place, the yield of guns
and, possibly, other incriminating evidence could have been ex-
pected to be lower per stop of a person racially out of place than
racially in place in either a black or white target area.
If all stops during the Indianapolis experiment had been coded
by race, target area and yield, police, prosecutorial and judicial
records could also have been used to develop an understanding of
police racial attitudes and beliefs.23' In particular, information
about the levels of police fear of and hostility towards blacks,
whites and racially out of place individuals could have been gained
from descriptions of the intrusiveness of stops in police,
prosecutorial and court records. Given the coding, further relevant
information about police motivation might have been gained from
statements in the records about both the grounds for officers' deci-
sions to stop and/or frisk and the grounds for any decisions not to
arrest and/or charge individuals whose frisks yielded incriminating
evidence.232 The coding would also have facilitated racial compari-
sons of the numbers and results of any suppression motions or civil
rights actions brought as a result of the Indianapolis experiment.
Data was not collected, however, on the race of those stopped
during the Indianapolis experiment and therefore racial compari-
sons of yield were not and cannot be made. Thus, an opportunity
was lost to develop the requisite empirical basis for determining
the role that racial bias now plays in decisions to stop and frisk. As
231. These official records would undoubtedly include formulaic and self-serving
statements. However, as the phenomenon of the "smoking gun" shows, revealing
statements would also be likely to be made.
232. Some of this information was included in the police records for the Kansas
City Experiment. Sherman's colleague, J. Wilford Shaw, recounts that:
[For] every carrying a concealed weapon arrest effected by patrol officers,
the officer must obtain the signature of a supervisory detective, attesting to
probable cause for making the arrest and search .... It was estimated ...
that approximately one-third of the defendants were charged with less than
the maximum state firearms charge because the detectives were not certain
about the probable cause. The exact number of times this occurred is., how-
ever, not available. The reason for a particular charge, e.g., weak probable
cause, is not included in the report.
Detecting Guns, supra note 4, at 25.
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argued above, even absent this knowledge, there remain strong
grounds to believe that police racial bias, and not greater black
criminality alone, contributes to the racially disparate incidence of
stops and frisks.233 The lack of any well-grounded estimate of the
relative roles of police racial bias and greater black criminality
makes it impossible to determine, however, what, if any, legal or
administrative limits on the stop and frisk power are needed to
curb racial bias. More broadly, the gap in our empirical knowledge
makes it impossible to determine how the law and social policy in
general, as well as Fourth Amendment law and police department
guidelines in particular, should respond to the racially disparate in-
cidence of stops and frisks.234
This lack of knowledge is not only regrettable from the stand-
points of racial justice and civil liberties. Even if we are willing to
claim that the fight against crime supersedes all concern with racial
justice and individual privacy, facts about racial impact remain rel-
evant. A central insight of the Kerner Commission and President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
was that police practices do not only succeed or fail at combating
existing crime. As the 1960s riots showed and the Rodney King
riot reemphasized, police abuses may themselves create racial ten-
sions that erupt in riots and crime.235 Police practices may, addi-
233. See supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 189-203 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for the views of the Kerner and
President's Commissions. Recently, in the aftermath of the Rodney King riots, schol-
ars have delineated similar relationships among police abuses and riots and crime.
Thus, Smith claims that the Rodney King riots illustrate the fact that "racial prejudice
and discriminatory actions at several points in the criminal justice process are the
immediate cause of an escalating criminal response among black people; also, hostility
to the police and courts among black people at each stage is an immediate cause of an
increasingly prejudiced and unfair response by the criminal justice system. It is rea-
sonable to say that unequal treatment of black people by the criminal justice system
was a cause of the Los Angeles riots, hence a cause of the high crime rate among
black people; and that the high black crime rate was a cause of unequal treatment of
black people (but no excuse)." Smith, supra note 184, at 1048-49; see also id. at 1110.
More generally, Skolnick and Fyfe reflect that "even when iron-handed law en-
forcement proves effective in general, it also invites retaliation by those who are not
intimidated by it. Abusive police must then raise the force ante, employing ever more
severe violence to continue to seem formidable .... Those who are being policed do
not distinguish among blue uniforms. All cops come to be defined as brutal, and thus
appropriate targets for retaliation." SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 28, at 96.
As previously noted, both the Police Task Force Report and the Kerner Commis-
sion called for research on the impact of aggressive patrol techniques, including stops
and frisks, on police relations with minority communities. See supra note 38.
A question, which I intend to pursue in a later work, is whether, by deferring to
police expertise and holding that heightened legal standards are powerless to combat
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tionally, discourage members of minority communities from aiding
in the solution of crimes and contribute to alienation that erupts in
crime.236 This is relevant to the legal delimitation of the stop and
frisk power because, Terry to the contrary, there is no reason to
believe that police racism is uniquely unresponsive to legal regula-
tion. The arguments for the potential efficacy of legal regulation
police racism, the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio contributed to the ab-
sence of such research.
236. Thus, the President's Commission spoke of the difficulty in "[c]arrying out
with proper efficiency and discretion the complicated law enforcement and commu-
nity-service tasks the police are expected to perform.... In city slums and ghettos
• . .[t]here is much distrust of the police, especially among boys and young men,
among the people the police most often deal with. It is common in those neighbor-
hoods for citizens to fail to report crimes or refuse to cooperate in investigations.
Often policemen are sneered at or insulted on the street. Sometimes they are vio-
lently assaulted. Indeed, everyday police encounters in such neighborhoods can set
off riots..." PRESIDErrr's COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 34, at 99.
The Commission further argued that "[p]olice agencies cannot preserve the public
peace and control crime unless the public participates more fully than it now does in
law enforcement. Bad community feeling does more than create tensions and engen-
der actions against the police that in turn may embitter policemen and trigger irra-
tional responses from them. It stimulates crime." Id. at 100.
The Kerner Commission similarly warned: "It is axiomatic that effective law en-
forcement requires the support of the community. Such support will not be present
when a substantial segment of the community feels threatened by the police and re-
gards the police as an occupying force." KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
20, at 301.
Sherman himself has recently argued that unfair police practices may produce the
"defiant" response of increased crime. Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A The-
ory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RsCH IN CRIME & DELINO. 444, 463-466 (1993).
Although he cites this work in his evaluation of the Kansas City Gun Experiment,
supra note 4, at 9, he fails to recognize that it shows the need to consider whether an
unintended side effect of his Gun Experiments may be the creation of an additional
avenue for the expression of police racial bias.
The argument that police practices are to be judged not only by their success or-
failure at combatting existing crime but also by whether they encourage or discourage
future crime is an instance of a more general argument that I have advanced else-
where. Namely, social institutions and practices necessarily affect the formation of
future interests and abilities at the same time as they prevent or fail to prevent partic-
ular actions at a particular time. Hence, social institutions and practices are to be
evaluated not only from the standpoint of people's existing interests, but also by con-
sidering the types of interests and abilities that they influence people to form. See,
e.g., Schwartz, Towards a Jurisprudence of Labour Law: Methodological Preliminaries,
19 VAL. L. REV. 71 (1984), and Against Universality, LXXVIII J. PHIL. 127, 139-43
(1981). Once one recognizes this, one sees the wrongheadedness of Wilson's assump-
tion that we can choose between combatting crime by "rely[ing] on the criminal-jus-
tice system," on the one hand, or, on the other hand, by "attack[ing] the root causes
of crime." See What to Do about Crime, supra note 2, at 32. In advancing this dichot-
omy, Wilson fails to recognize that the measures the criminal justice system employs
to investigate particular people and sanction them for engaging in particular crimes
will themselves affect the dispositions that they and their fellow citizens form in re-
gard to future crimes.
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additionally imply that legal regulation may be necessary to stimu-
late police departments to deter racism themselves by instituting
their own strict, racially neutral guidelines. It follows that neither
Wilson's nor Sherman's lack of concern with racial impact can
rightly be considered part of a realistic approach to crime. Since
there are strong reasons to believe that racist abuses can be curbed
by racially neutral limits on the stop and frisk power, we need to
know how significant a role racial bias plays in decisions to stop
and frisk. Only then can courts, police departments, legislatures
and policy makers properly respond to the racially disparate inci-
dence of stops and frisks.
VI. Conclusion
Recently, two of America's foremost policy makers and crimi-
nologists-James Q. Wilson and Lawrence Sherman-have advo-
cated increased use of stops and frisks as a means for fighting gun
crime. While both Wilson and Sherman recognize that their pro-
posals are likely to result in blacks being stopped and frisked more
frequently than whites, both assume that this racially disparate im-
pact is legally and normatively irrelevant. This Article criticizes
this assumption by showing that it is grounded in a fallacious argu-
ment in the 1968 Supreme Court case of Terry v. Ohio.
This Article contends that evidence exists to conclude that the
greater incidence of stops and frisks of blacks is attributable to ra-
cial animus and/or an unwarranted cognitive equation of being
black with being dangerous. The extent to which this is the case,
however, is unclear. If courts, police departments legislatures and
policy makers are properly to respond to the racially disparate inci-
dence of stops and frisks, criminological researchers must remedy
this gap in our knowledge. Well-grounded comparisons are needed
of the extent to which the racially disparate incidence of stops and
frisks is caused by police bias against blacks or greater black crimi-
nality and corresponding police expertise in apprehending those
most likely to be involved in crime.
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